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Summary
The Government has announced a ‘devolution revolution’, transferring powers and 
opportunities to local government through a series of ‘devolution deals’. The Cities and 
Local Government Devolution Bill gives statutory authority to deals and enables some 
of the specific reforms the Government wishes to make, such as introducing directly-
elected mayors for combined authorities. This inquiry set out to examine the contents of 
the Bill and, in particular, whether Greater Manchester’s deal is a model for other areas, 
but its scope quickly widened to a review of the way in which devolution in England is 
proceeding.
We strongly support the principle of devolution. We welcome the fact that, at the start 
of this new Parliament, it occupies such a prominent position on the Government’s 
agenda. We acknowledge the personal contribution of Greg Clark, whose support 
and involvement since 2010 has been key in driving devolution. We expect to see this 
commitment continue, and for it to be shared by an increasing number of Departments, 
over the next four and a half years. 
We are acutely aware that all deals are at an early stage and need time to bed in, and that 
many devolution bids are still to be negotiated. We therefore expect to review progress 
by the end of this Parliament and at regular intervals thereafter. Although it was not 
the focus of this inquiry, in line with our predecessors, we will continue to press for 
fiscal devolution: our next inquiry will look at the plans to allow local authorities to 
retain 100 per cent of business rates, and we will review the progress made on fiscal 
devolution. 
We have identified various aspects of the current approach that we recommend are 
refined and improved now. Otherwise, the policy risks being rushed and appearing 
driven by a purely political timetable. We see a role for scrutiny by select committees 
of the secondary legislation enacting deals and the Government’s annual report on 
devolution, required by the Bill.
We have found a significant lack of public consultation and engagement at all stages in 
the devolution process. People are keen to be involved; our public session in Greater 
Manchester highlighted residents’ strong appetite to be included and consulted. The 
public should be engaged in the preparation of devolution proposals, insofar as possible 
during the negotiations and once the results of a deal have begun to make an impact, 
and communicated to throughout the process. This is particularly the case for health 
devolution where the systems in place are complex, changes are consequently more 
difficult to understand and the public’s response is likely to be more emotional.
We also believe that the Government’s approach to devolution in practice has lacked 
rigour as to process: there are no clear, measurable objectives for devolution, the 
timetable is rushed and efforts are not being made to inject openness or transparency 
into the deal negotiations. We suggest various ways in which proper process can be 
ensured; for example, with an agreed timetable for the negotiation and agreement of a 
deal.
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Once deals are up and running, there will be a complex division of responsibility—
between local authorities, the combined authority and, in some places, the directly-
elected mayor—which will not necessarily be apparent to the public. Responsibility 
needs to be determined in a way that makes sense to the public, and consideration of 
these issues should be a significant part of the deal-making process with the division 
of responsibilities clearly spelled out. We received no clear explanation as to how 
accountability under health devolution will work and have recommended that the 
Government revisits this issue. There is a need for a clear articulation of how health 
devolution will work.
We strongly believe that areas should be able to acquire further devolved powers over 
time. Where an area has asked for particular devolved powers but was refused, those 
powers should be available to it if they are given to other similar areas at a later date. 
Our ambition is that, by the end of this Parliament, the Government and local 
authorities will reach the position of ‘devolution by right’, with the Government having 
announced a package of powers that will be on offer to local government. This would 
be a starting point for even more ambitious and wide-ranging future deals and possibly 
a more comprehensive package of devolved measures agreed between Government and 
local government as a whole.
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1 Introduction
1. We have a continuing interest in devolution of power from central to local government. 
In July 2014, our predecessors published a report entitled Devolution in England: the case 
for local government.1 That report’s principal conclusion was that local communities in 
England should be allowed to take greater control over how money is raised and spent 
in their areas and we remain committed to that approach. We were therefore eager to 
examine the Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill2 which introduces directly-
elected mayors3 for combined authorities and transfers powers to local areas in England, 
and announced our intention to conduct an inquiry shortly after our first meeting as a 
newly constituted committee. Although the inquiry was designed around the contents of 
the Devolution Bill, it became wider in scope as it progressed, looking at the consequences 
of the approach to devolution that the legislation facilitates. It also became clear that the 
term ‘devolution’ was being used to describe situations other than, but similar to, the 
transfer of responsibilities to local government: for example, in the health context, it 
was being used to describe what is, in practical terms, delegation, and ‘devolution’ deals 
include various joint working initiatives. 
2. The Devolution Bill does not enable fiscal devolution, giving only limited financial 
powers to local areas.4 One of our Greater Manchester witnesses said, “We have had 
devolutionary powers with almost no devolution of borrowing power […] It’s utterly 
nonsensical”.5 We agree, believing fiscal devolution to be essential to genuine devolution. 
The recently announced business rates reforms and the social care ‘precept’ are moves 
in the right direction,6 but we could go much further. We endorse the recommendations 
of our predecessors who called for greater freedom over council tax and business rates, 
devolution of other property taxes and, in time, the devolution of larger-scale, more 
comprehensive fiscal powers to groups of local authorities, including borrowing powers 
and examining the apportioning of income tax and VAT.7 Although not the focus of this 
report, we will continue to press for fiscal devolution: our next inquiry will look at the 
plans to allow local authorities to retain 100 per cent of business rates, and we will review 
the progress made on fiscal devolution. 
3. We received over 50 submissions from local authorities, the voluntary and community 
sectors, academics, think tanks and members of the public. The themes emerging from 
our written evidence were explored in five evidence sessions, which took place between 
October and November 2015. We also visited Greater Manchester to see for ourselves 
how their devolution deal is taking shape and better understand the practicalities of it by 
speaking to the people involved. We also held a well-attended, lively question and answer 
session with residents to gauge their reaction to the reforms taking place in their city.
1 Communities and Local Government Committee, First Report of Session 2014-15, Devolution in England: the case for 
local government, HC 503
2 Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [Lords] [Bill 80 (2015-16)] [hereafter “the Devolution Bill”]
3 Hereafter, the term ‘mayor’ or ‘elected mayor’ should be taken to mean a directly-elected mayor.
4 See, for example, the Local Government Association (DEV 021) para 2.3 and the County Councils Network (DEV 052) 
5 Q74
6 “Chancellor unveils ‘devolution revolution’”, HM Treasury press release, 5 October 2015 and HM Treasury, Spending 
Review 2015, November 2015, p33
7 Communities and Local Government Committee, First Report of Session 2014-15, Devolution in England: the case for 
local government, HC 503
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4. We are grateful to all those who gave us written and oral evidence, to our hosts in 
Greater Manchester, to the Working Well programme and to the residents who attended 
our public session. Particular thanks are due to our specialist advisers, Professor Tony 
Travers of the London School of Economics and Professor Alan Harding of the University 
of Liverpool.8
The development of devolution
5. Devolution of responsibilities and powers to local government has been developing 
incrementally. During the last Parliament, the then Government introduced a number of 
devolutionary measures, the most important of which were city deals and Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs).    
6. A series of ‘city deals’ were agreed between 2011 and 2014; a ‘first wave’ with the eight 
Core Cities9 by July 2012 and, by July 2014, another 20 with smaller cities and city regions.10 
The deals did not transfer general powers to local authorities. Instead, they provided cities, 
working with the local LEP, with a small amount of additional funding to be used flexibly 
for specific programmes and outcomes.11 Some of them also provided selective, additional 
borrowing capacity, retention of some or all of any growth in income from business rates 
and greater influence over programmes formerly delivered by Government Departments, 
their agencies and contractors. 
7. A range of influential reports on devolution, published in 2014,12 proposed that local 
areas should take on more powers linked to growing local economies, such as skills, new 
housing development and business support, and reforming public services, for example 
health and social care. They also suggested new governance models, recommended 
devolution to combined authorities and the prioritisation of cities or ‘metros’, as well as 
enhanced powers over local taxes. 
8. It was in this context that, in June 2014, the Chancellor gave a speech in Manchester 
in which he introduced the idea of a ‘Northern Powerhouse’, saying:
The cities of the north are individually strong, but collectively not strong 
enough [...] So the powerhouse of London dominates more and more. And 
that’s not healthy for our economy. It’s not good for our country. We need a 
Northern Powerhouse too. Not one city, but a collection of northern cities—
sufficiently close to each other that combined they can take on the world.13 
8 Tony Travers declared the following interests: Occasional fees for speaking engagements, work on commissions and 
consultancy. Alan Harding declared the following interests: I have verbally been offered the job of Chief Economist 
to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and have accepted in principle, subject to contract. I am due to start 
the new role in January and remain in my current academic post until then.
9 Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield
10 For full details of the 20 other city deals, see Centre for Cities, Cities Policy Briefing: Setting out Coalition Government 
policies across a common framework, September 2014, p9 
11 For details of the Wave 1 city deals, see HM Treasury, Unlocking growth in cities: city deals—wave 1, July 2012
12 See, for example, City Growth Commission, Unleashing metro growth: final recommendations of the City Growth 
Commission, October 2014; IPPR North, Decentralisation decade: A plan for economic prosperity, public service 
transformation and democratic renewal in England, September 2014; ResPublica, Devo Max Devo Manc: Place-based 
public services, September 2014
13 “Chancellor: ‘We need a Northern powerhouse’”, HM Treasury press release, 23 June 2014
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9. Devolution gathered further momentum after the referendum in September 2014 on 
independence for Scotland, when the Prime Minister announced that, alongside proposals 
for additional devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, “It is also important we 
have wider civic engagement about how to improve governance in our United Kingdom, 
including how to empower our great cities”.14 In November, the first ‘devolution deal’ was 
announced between the Government and Greater Manchester. This was followed by deals 
for Sheffield,15 Leeds16 and Cornwall.17
10. In May 2015, legislation to “provide for the devolution of powers to cities with elected 
metro mayors, helping to build a Northern Powerhouse” was announced in the Queen’s 
Speech. Originally trailed in the press as a ‘City Devolution Bill’, the announcement of 
a ‘Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill’18 was welcomed by local authorities as 
enabling devolution to all parts of England, not just cities.19 
11. The Treasury invited areas to submit devolution proposals by 4 September 2015 to be 
considered during the 2015 Spending Review process. 38 cities and regions (including four 
in total from Scotland and Wales) put forward bids20 and deals were subsequently agreed 
with the North-East,21 Tees Valley,22 the West Midlands,23 Liverpool24 and a further deal 
with Sheffield.25 Other deals are still in negotiation. Deals are negotiated and implemented 
by the Cities and Local Growth Unit, a joint team from the Cabinet Office, Department 
for Communities and Local Government and Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills. Previously, the Unit had been called the ‘Cities Policy Unit’ and, based in the 
Cabinet Office, had negotiated city deals.  
12. Alongside the deals, two significant fiscal reforms have been announced. In a speech 
to the Conservative Party Conference in October 2015 in which he spoke of a “devolution 
revolution”,26 the Chancellor outlined his plan to allow local authorities to retain 100 
per cent of business rates by the end of this Parliament. Local authorities will also have 
powers to reduce rates and increases will be restricted to 2p on the rate, to be spent on 
infrastructure, for mayoral combined authorities that secure agreement from their LEP. 
Then, in November, the Spending Review announced that local authorities dealing with 
social care could apply a social care ‘precept’ of a 2 per cent rise in council tax, over and 
above any referendum threshold set for local authorities in general (in recent years, 2 per 
cent), which implies a 4 per cent threshold for relevant authorities.27
14 “Scottish Independence Referendum: statement by the Prime Minister”, Prime Minister’s Office press release, 19 
September 2015
15 HM Government, Sheffield City Region Agreement on Devolution, December 2014, followed by HM Treasury, 
Sheffield City Region Devolution Agreement, October 2015
16 HM Government, Leeds City Region and West Yorkshire Agreement on Devolution, March 2015
17 HM Government, Cornwall Devolution Deal: Kevambos Digresennans Kernow, July 2015
18 Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [Lords] [Bill 80 (2015-16)]
19 “Devolution bill name change ‘encouraging’”, Local Government Chronicle, 27 May 2015
20 “Landmark devolution bids submitted from right across the country”, Department for Communities and Local 
Government press release, 11 September 2015
21 HM Treasury, North East devolution agreement, October 2015
22 HM Government, Tees Valley devolution agreement, October 2015
23 HM Treasury, West Midlands Combined Authority devolution agreement, November 2015
24 HM Treasury, Liverpool City Region devolution agreement, November 2015
25 HM Government, Sheffield City Region Agreement on Devolution, December 2014 and HM Treasury, Sheffield City 
Region Devolution Agreement, October 2015
26 “Chancellor unveils ‘devolution revolution’”, HM Treasury press release, 5 October 2015
27 HM Treasury, Spending Review 2015, November 2015, p33
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The Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill
13. The Explanatory Notes describe the Devolution Bill as “enabling legislation” 
providing “a legislative framework which can be applied flexibly to different areas 
by secondary legislation”.28 It provides for the creation of a directly-elected mayor of a 
combined authority to exercise specified functions, widens the range of functions that 
can be conferred on a combined authority beyond economic development, regeneration 
and transport, enables the changing of local government structures (such as mergers of 
councils and moves to unitary structures) and allows for public authority functions to 
be conferred on a combined or local authority. It enables Orders to be made for each 
local area to transfer powers in accordance with a devolution deal. Evidence we received 
raised concerns about whether the secondary legislation arising from the Devolution Bill 
would receive adequate parliamentary scrutiny.29 A parliamentary debate on the North 
East Devolution Deal was held in November 2015 at the request of a local Member of 
Parliament,30 but this is not standard practice. Secondary legislation receives little or 
no parliamentary scrutiny. For most of the Orders brought forward under the Bill, 
parliamentary scrutiny is likely to be limited. We therefore recommend regular 
select committee scrutiny of statutory instruments implementing devolution and the 
Government’s annual report on devolution, which is required by the Devolution Bill; 
for example, the Transport Committee might wish to examine proposals for devolution 
of transport powers. 
14. The Devolution Bill has been widely welcomed: for example, Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority welcomed “the permissive nature of the Bill […] drafted to 
incorporate the maximum degree of flexibility regarding the powers and functions that 
can be devolved”.31 However, Professor Colin Copus of De Montfort University said that 
it “maintains a centralist perspective in that ‘deals’ and ‘agreements’ must be negotiated 
with and agreed at the centre, rather than providing a framework within which local 
government can construct [...] its own ways of operating”,32 and concluded that “it does 
not facilitate a fundamental shift from the centre”.33 
28 Explanatory Notes to the Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [Bill 80 (2015-16) – EN]
29 NHS Confederation (DEV 046) para 4.3
30 HC Deb, 26 November, col 453WH [Westminster Hall]
31 Greater Manchester Combined Authority (DEV 009) 
32 Professor Colin Copus (DEV 019) 
33 Professor Colin Copus (DEV 019) 
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2 Devolution: objectives and approach
Objectives
15. The consensus of the evidence we received is that devolution is a good thing. The large 
majority of our witnesses approved of the Government’s intentions, with some individual 
caveats, and were enthusiastic at the prospect of local areas gaining greater powers. We 
sought to identify the objectives of devolution and see whether there was a consistent 
sense at all levels of what it was designed to achieve. Our witnesses offered us a whole 
range of possible objectives. Professor Andy Pike, Newcastle University, said:
There are about five at last count. There is certainly the local growth 
and economic development side of things. […] There is the public sector 
transformation and savings stuff. There are two others as well that perhaps 
do not get addressed as much. One is the idea of greater accountability—the 
idea that Government can be brought closer to the people and made more 
accountable as a result—and then perhaps the other is about decentralisation 
being a better way to address some of these big societal challenges around 
ageing, climate change and so forth through more devolved arrangements.34  
16. Professor Colin Copus, De Montfort University, said devolution is about economic 
growth and “rebalancing the economy”, by which we understand a more selective geographic 
rebalancing of the economy aspired to by, for example, the Northern Powerhouse and the 
Midlands Engine. He went on to say that:
In that journey, there have been a number of other objectives collected as 
well. Public sector reform, certainly, looking at issues like transport, health 
and housing, and how those particular service areas integrate across any given 
geographical area, is central to this particular agenda. That brings up another 
objective about what is the role of local government with all of this and whether 
there is a barely-hidden agenda, maybe, to start to think about restructuring.35
17. We heard that health devolution had its own different set of objectives. During 
our visit to Greater Manchester, we were told that their ambitions for health devolution 
included, as well as improving population health and longevity, helping people into work, 
improving self-care, standardising hospital treatment, caring for people with long-term 
conditions at home and provision of wraparound services for people with dementia. 
18. Professor Pike summed up: “Overall, there is a lack of clarity, in some ways. There 
is an overlap and a bit of confusion, perhaps, sometimes in terms of which rationales 
are promoted at which points”.36 We asked the Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government, Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, for his objectives for devolution. He said “To 
restore to the cities, towns and counties of the country the ability to drive their local 
economies forward and to be more successful socially and environmentally as well”.37 This 
formulation, while admirable in intent, is unspecific. The Minister for Community and 
Social Care, Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP, said the core objective for health devolution was 
34 Q4 [Professor A Pike]
35 Q4 [Professor C Copus]
36 Q4 [Professor A Pike]
37 Q260
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generating better health outcomes and giving an impetus to current work to integrate 
health services.38 We believe that the Government should set out the aims of its 
devolution policy more clearly, preferably in a way that would, over time, allow success 
to be measured. The Government needs a clear hierarchy for the many things it is trying 
to achieve through devolution—promoting local growth at minimum cost, achieving 
a better balanced economy, improving integration of public services, enhancing local 
freedom to experiment, bringing decision-making closer to local communities and 
enhancing the democratic process. It also needs to be clear how the forms of devolution 
it favours are intended to achieve them, while recognising that there may be a different 
balance and mix of objectives in different areas.
19. Setting out clear objectives for devolution is of crucial importance so that there are 
measurable outcomes from the process.  The Centre for Public Scrutiny (CfPS) said:
Devolution requires clarity on ‘why’ devolution is a necessity […] we are 
concerned, from press coverage and from our own knowledge of the sector, 
that a number of councils are pursuing devolution deals without having the 
evidence to back up their assertions, or a clear sense of why devolution in 
certain areas will improve services.39 
20. Clear objectives, which can be embedded in devolution deals, are an essential part 
of the monitoring and assessment process. However, Professor Pike said that “There is a 
real gap in terms of monitoring, assessment and evaluation”.40 We asked Greg Clark about 
how the effectiveness of deals would be monitored: he replied that, given the ambitions for 
devolution were broad, there was no single measure of success. He talked about the trend 
rate of growth in places with deals increasing, greater prosperity for residents, people 
feeling they are getting better services and, after a period of time, thinking “Actually, that 
was a move in the right direction”.41 Alistair Burt said that, with health devolution, local 
areas should be able to demonstrate that key outcomes, which may be health inequalities 
or other indicators, like winter pressures and moving seamlessly from secondary to 
primary care in the community, are better.42
21. As set out above, our witnesses gave us many important and ambitious reasons for 
pursuing devolution, particularly so for health devolution. However, with the exception 
of increasing economic growth, we are not certain whether these are intended to be 
the measurable objectives of devolution and are not convinced that the Government 
itself is any clearer. We are also not satisfied that the Government has considered and 
identified how to measure the success of a devolution deal once in place. 
22. We recommend that the Government publishes, in order of priority, its long-term 
objectives for devolution, the mechanisms needed to achieve these and the means by 
which it will measure success. Following discussions with the local areas involved, 
relevant objectives can be incorporated in each devolution deal. This would enable 
areas to assess whether they are doing better with a deal than without. Linked to this, 
the Government should set up a mechanism for monitoring deals and reviewing and 
consulting the public on their impact. This would also make it easier to gather and 
38 Q223
39 Centre for Public Scrutiny (DEV 041) 
40 Q9
41 Q263
42 Q224
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disseminate best practice and lessons learnt. Local areas must have the powers needed to 
achieve the objectives of devolution, for example to integrate and deliver public services 
aligned to local needs. In the annual report (described in more detail at paragraph 45), 
they should state whether they have been given sufficient powers, levers and resources 
by each of the Government Departments involved to achieve the objectives of a deal and 
what more is needed.
Approach: deal-making
23. After city deals, growth deals and now devolution deals, the current approach to 
devolution in England is overtly one of deal-making, which can be characterised as 
negotiations behind closed doors between central government and representatives of 
local authorities. Professor Pike said the deal-making process was a way of working 
between “a top-down Whitehall blueprint” and a “complete bottom-up free for all”.43 Lord 
Kerslake, the Chair of the CfPS, and former Permanent Secretary at the Department for 
Communities and Local Government, said that approaching devolution in this way meant 
that:
You stop the problem that previously bedevilled devolution, which was unless 
everyone did it the same way, it was not going to happen. The risk of a formulaic 
or framework approach is that you get to a lowest common denominator.44
24. Indeed, one of the consequences of deal-making is that devolution does not happen 
in a uniform manner; deals have so far been agreed with seven city regions45 and 
with Cornwall. Professor Pike described it as “very ad hoc” and “piecemeal”.46 This is 
compounded by the fact that some places are more ready to take on devolved powers than 
others and will forge ahead, for example Greater Manchester (which we will consider in 
more detail from paragraph 28 below) and Cornwall. As Cllr John Pollard, the Leader of 
Cornwall Council, told us:
We managed to be the first non-metropolitan area to secure a deal, because 
we were actually ready for it. We had been working for some 12 months before 
on fairer funding projects and trying to look at the funding of Cornwall in 
relation to the funding of other areas.47
Alexandra Jones, the Chief Executive of the Centre for Cities, reinforced this point, saying 
“some places are ready for and want different powers. They want to take on more”.48 
25. But there also needs to be a readiness on the part of Government to devolve the 
new powers which local areas ask for. The Minister for Local Growth and the Northern 
Powerhouse, James Wharton MP, said “The issue has occasionally been, ‘The ask coming 
from this local area goes further than we can be confident in going at this time’”.49 However, 
he went on to say:
43 Q16
44 Q172
45 Greater Manchester, Sheffield, West Yorkshire, Liverpool, West Midlands, North East, Tees Valley
46 Q9
47 Q132
48 Q16
49 Q279
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We often then discover that we can find some sort of compromise they are 
happy with and we will continue, as part of the nature of the devolution 
process, to look to see if we can go further in the future and what other levels 
we might be able to make available to them to reach their objectives.50
We were pleased to hear the Government indicate that the deal-making process is ongoing 
and evolutionary. Greg Clark confirmed this by saying:
It is a characteristically ingenious approach from the leaders of Sheffield […] 
that anything agreed with anywhere else should reopen the discussions with 
Sheffield. That is exactly the sort of ingenuity I had hoped for when we saw 
these deals.
Of course, everyone looks very closely at what is being negotiated in those 
places. Because this is not a one-off final chance, people do come back, and 
we have seen this in Greater Manchester. I am absolutely certain that Sheffield 
will, as it demonstrates its ability to make use of the powers, come back and 
ask for more. Some of those will be determined from the experience on the 
ground and some by looking over their shoulder and saying, “This city over 
there has done this. We did not think of that, but now we have seen it and we 
would like to do the same.” I very much expect this approach to continue.51#
26. We believe that deal-making, which seeks to find a balance between a ‘bottom-up’ 
or ‘top-down’ approach, is a pragmatic way to approach devolution, and we particularly 
agree with Lord Kerslake’s comments that a framework approach to devolution at this 
early stage in the process can lead to the lowest common denominator. The natural 
consequence of deal-making is bespoke but asymmetric devolution as places ready to 
take on more powers put forward proposals and agree deals ahead of others. 
27. In acknowledgement of this asymmetry, it should be made explicit in each devolution 
deal that areas may acquire further devolved powers over time. Where an area has 
asked for particular devolved powers but was refused them, if still desired, such powers 
should be available to that area if they have been given to other similar areas at a later 
date. By the end of the Parliament, we should have reached the position of devolution by 
right to local areas, with the Government having announced the powers that will be on 
offer to local government. This would then provide a basis for the negotiation of further, 
more ambitious deals covering new policy areas and/or a more comprehensive package 
of devolved measures agreed between Government and local government as a whole.
50 Q279
51 Q279
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3 Agreed deals
Greater Manchester
28. The Greater Manchester Agreement52 was concluded in November 2014 with health 
and other additional powers being agreed in February,53 July54 and November 2015.55 The 
extent of the deal and the interest and attention it generated made us want to look at 
whether it was a model for other areas. 
29. The Centre for Cities argued that the Greater Manchester deal was a good model for 
other city devolution deals, especially for large regions, in that it “set out clear terms for 
the type of governance arrangements expected, and which of the powers that underpin 
successful city economies could be devolved from central government”.56 The New Local 
Government Network (NLGN) said that it appeared to provide a “de facto model for other 
cities”.57 However, both organisations were cautious about its applicability to other areas; 
the former saying it could “not be easily lifted and dropped on to other city regions, where 
the physical and economic geography may differ”58 and the latter saying the Government 
could not “simply roll out the same model everywhere”.59 Professor Copus of De Montfort 
University also struck a note of caution when he said that “in the spirit of devolution it is 
dangerous to look for a model”60 and the evidence we received warned many times against 
a “one-size-fits-all” approach.61
30. Many of our witnesses emphasised that the Greater Manchester devolution deal was 
the product of the city’s unique circumstances and was, therefore, not a model for other 
areas.62 The most significant difference compared to other places was the long history of 
joint working between the ten Greater Manchester authorities. The Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority said:
The ten Greater Manchester district councils have a long and unrivalled history 
of collaboration, characterised by consistent leadership and hard work over 
many years. Following the abolition of the Greater Manchester Council in the 
1980s, the district councils established the Association of Greater Manchester 
52 HM Treasury, Greater Manchester Agreement: Devolution to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and 
transition to a directly elected mayor, 3 November 2014
53 NHS England, Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Devolution Memorandum of Understanding, 27 February 
2015
54 HM Treasury, Further devolution to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and directly-elected Mayor, 8 July 
2015
55 HM Treasury, Spending Review and Autumn Statement Update, Further devolution to the Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority and directly-elected Mayor, 27 November 2015
56 Centre for Cities (DEV 031) 
57 New Local Government Network (DEV 053) para 5
58 Centre for Cities (DEV 031) para 3
59 New Local Government Network (DEV 053) para 10
60 Q25
61 See, for example, Greater Manchester Combined Authority (DEV 009), Chief Economic Development Officers Society 
and the Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transportation (DEV 013) para 12, Core 
Cities (DEV 014) para 1.3, British Property Federation (DEV 028) para 6
62 See, for example, Centre for Public Scrutiny (DEV 041), County Councils Network (DEV 052), South East England 
Councils (DEV 026), Core Cities (DEV 014) 
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Authorities, a non-statutory body, with the aim of securing collaboration 
and joint-working on pan-GM issues. In April 2011, the Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority was established to provide strong and effective 
governance, with responsibilities and powers covering the transport-related 
functions previously administered by the Greater Manchester Integrated 
Transport Authority and a remit in relation to economic development and 
regeneration.63
31. Joint working is bound to have been facilitated by the compact geography and 
structure of local government in the city region. South East England Councils said “The 
ten Manchester authorities have equal status and powers as metropolitan districts, cover 
a relatively small area and have one ‘core city’ as their major economic driver”.64 The 
NLGN agreed, saying “Manchester benefits from an unusually coherent geography, clear 
agglomeration effects in the city region’s urban core, councils that are all of the same 
tier and a very cohesive political culture”.65 Witnesses also mentioned the city’s “success 
story in political leadership” and its “prioritisation by particularly the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer”.66 We also heard that Greater Manchester’s functional economic geography,67 
which aligns with the city’s boundaries, distinguishes it from other areas. Devolution to a 
functional economic area is the Government’s favoured approach68 and we support this. 
Where the objective of a deal is economic growth, devolution should be to areas whose 
boundaries follow the local economic geography, while recognising the challenges this 
can pose to established local government arrangements.
32. We also heard that Greater Manchester Combined Authority had a particularly strong 
vision and set of ambitions for the city and its residents, including a focus on “a game-
changing investment in growth” and “taking demand out of the system through better 
joined-up public services”.69 The Centre for Public Scrutiny (CfPS) said “the development 
of a strong proposition to put to Government on devolution would have been far less of a 
challenge than elsewhere”.70
33. Alexandra Jones, the Chief Executive of the Centre for Cities, suggested that there 
were “strong lessons” for other places from Greater Manchester’s experience of devolution 
“in the way they have done things—the way they have learned to work together and 
establish trust”.71 The CfPS also identified some other ‘lessons’:
Devolution is a process, not an event. The continual nature of the discussions 
in Manchester over the devolution of more powers over time is something we 
think reflects the reality across England, that devolution will be a continually 
running process.
63 Greater Manchester Combined Authority (DEV 009) 
64 South East England Councils (DEV 026) para 3.2
65 New Local Government Network (DEV 053) para 8
66 Q25 [Professor C Copus]
67 City of Wakefield Metropolitan Council (DEV 010) para 1.6 and County Councils Network (DEV 052) 
68 Department for Communities and Local Government (DEV 027) para 7c
69 Greater Manchester Combined Authority (DEV 009) 
70 Centre for Public Scrutiny (DEV 041) 
71 Q25
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Devolution requires clarity on *why* devolution is a necessity. Manchester 
is unique in having long-standing subregional working arrangements. This 
allowed it to take a compelling, unified vision to Government about the future 
of the area.72 
34. The Greater Manchester deal provides a prime example of the type of governance 
arrangements expected by the Government and the powers that might be devolved. 
As it is a product of the particular circumstances of that city which are unlikely to be 
reproduced in other areas in all their aspects, this deal should not be assumed to be a 
model for other areas pursuing devolution, even cities. However, other areas pursuing 
deals may wish to reflect upon and cultivate Manchester’s characteristics: a history of 
joint working between authorities, trust between leaders, acceptance that devolution 
will take place gradually and proactively presenting Government with ideas and 
solutions for their city. 
Health devolution 
35. The announcement in November 2014 of devolution of health and social care to 
Greater Manchester, and the subsequent signing of the Memorandum of Understanding73 
by the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, the Government, NHS England and 12 
Clinical Commissioning Groups, have attracted a great deal of attention. We received 
convincing evidence that, as with the Greater Manchester devolution deal, health 
devolution to the city (which we discuss in further detail in chapter 6) was a product of 
its unique circumstances. The British Medical Association (BMA) said that “Few, if any, 
of the other areas which might seek devolved health and social care settlements have such 
a long history of collaboration and partnership working between local authorities”.74 In 
addition, the Local Government Association pointed out that the broad health challenges 
facing the 10 local authority areas were similar, making the agreement of key strategic 
health and wellbeing priorities easier, and that there was a “high degree of congruence 
between the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and the health economy, with the 
majority of patient flows occurring within the Greater Manchester area”.75 Rob Webster, 
the Chief Executive of the NHS Confederation, said:
Clearly it provides some themes and learning, but it is not a model for 
everywhere. […] the Greater Manchester organisation has been working 
together since 1986. The footprints are different in terms of service from other 
places. Relationships are different. The financial and population issues are 
different.76 
72 Centre for Public Scrutiny (DEV 041) 
73 NHS England, Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Devolution Memorandum of Understanding, 27 February 
2015
74 British Medical Association (DEV 003) para 5
75 Local Government Association (DEV 021) para 5.3
76 Q111
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36. The BMA and NHS Providers said, respectively, that “learning from the Greater 
Manchester deal could be considered by other areas”77 and that it was a “valuable example” 
of how health devolution could work.78 Due to the city’s unique circumstances, and 
also the fact that the population, their health challenges and the health economy are 
different from other places, health devolution in Greater Manchester is not a model 
for other areas. What is happening in Greater Manchester is, however, something for 
other areas to learn from. 
Other places: how bespoke is devolution?
37. During the course of the inquiry, devolution deals have been agreed with the North-
East, Tees Valley, the West Midlands, Liverpool and a further deal with Sheffield. Although 
the Government has frequently articulated its commitment to bespoke devolution,79 the 
deals concluded share a number of common elements; for example, the powers to be 
devolved and the requirement for an elected mayor (see table). However, there are some 
bespoke elements appearing in individual deals, for example ultra-fast broadband in the 
North East. We found the extent of the similarities surprising.80
77 British Medical Association (DEV 003) para 5
78 NHS Providers (DEV 046) para 2
79 See, for example, HC Deb, 14 October 2015, col 329 [Commons Chamber]
80 “Exclusive interview: Clark promises bespoke deals amid ‘big push’ on devolution”, Local Government Chronicle, 20 
May 2015
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38. Cllr Jeffrey, Leader of Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council, said about Tees 
Valley’s experience of negotiating the content of a deal that:
I suppose it is wrong to say we came across difficulties, but it was not easy to 
get in new stuff, so anything that had not been in other deals was very difficult 
to do. We talk about having a bespoke deal for the Tees Valley, but just how 
bespoke it is at the end of the day I do not know, because our deal includes a 
lot of things that have already been in other places. Indeed, that was something 
that came back to us: has another area done it? Has it been done elsewhere?81
She said that “we had some very specific things we wanted to do” but that it had been 
“difficult” to agree devolution for 16-to-18 further education and funding for culture.82 
When we asked our Greater Manchester witnesses whether they got everything they 
wanted in the deal, Cllr Kieran Quinn, Leader of Tameside Metropolitan Borough 
Council, said “I don’t think there was any secret that our ambitions were much larger 
than the deal itself”.83 The witnesses indicated that they would have liked more freedom 
to work on criminal justice, fiscal and education powers.84 It has been observed that 
devolution in England looks “like a menu with specials: certain options are available to all 
areas, but at the same time each area has been offered a few items that mark them out from 
their counterparts”.85 These include the Tees Valley working with Arts Council England 
to examine how its funding for culture could support Tees Valley’s economic growth and 
Cornwall working with the Government to support the development of deep geothermal 
energy resources.
39. The Minister for Local Growth and the Northern Powerhouse, James Wharton MP, 
denied that the Government was prescribing what should be in devolution deals but also 
acknowledged that “It is easier to work through things that have been agreed in other 
areas, where you can look at an example and say ‘That is how it is being done there’”.86 
Later on in the discussion, he said “The reality is that a lot of deals have commonality”.87 
However, at various points, he also emphasised that the Government was “keen not to 
force areas to have an identikit approach”, the need for “a genuinely bottom-up process 
where different areas will ask for different things” and “imagination and ambition, and 
different things to come in”.88 
40. We appreciate that there will be areas of commonality between deals as certain 
powers, for example transport and business support, are natural candidates for 
devolution to local areas because of their role in driving economic growth. However, 
we have heard that areas are making imaginative and ambitious requests for specific 
powers only to have them turned down, which leads us to question the commitment 
across Government Departments to truly bespoke devolution (we consider this issue 
further in paragraphs 41-45). In each deal, we would expect to see more than “a few 
items” that are not common to other deals being devolved and are devised by an area 
81 Q167
82 Q168
83 Q56
84 Q56 [Mr T Lloyd, Cllr K Quinn, Cllr S Derbyshire]
85 House of Commons Library, Second reading blog, Devolution deals and the powers offered to localities: a menu with 
specials?, 9 September 2015
86 Q274
87 Q275
88 Q274 
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as a unique response to its geography, economy or social needs. In addition, we would 
expect to see that commonly devolved powers reflect and respond to the geography, 
economy and social needs of the local area to which they pertain.
General observations
Commitment to devolution across Government Departments
41. While we do not doubt the Treasury’s and the Department for Communities and 
Local Government’s commitment to devolution, the evidence we received suggested that 
some Government Departments are less keen to devolve powers to local areas. Cllr Quinn’s 
impression was that the Chancellor had “managed to bully, cajole or persuade lots of his 
other ministerial colleagues to give up some of their powers”.89 Sarah Ayres, University 
of Bristol, who based her written evidence on interviews she conducted in 2012 and 2015 
with Government officials working on decentralisation, said “there is a perception in 
Whitehall that the big delivery departments—health, education and welfare—remain 
quietly cautious about decentralising budgets and functions locally”.90 James Wharton 
said that every Department recognised the importance of devolution, with the only 
challenge being “finding workable ways to deliver the asks that come forward”.91
42. During our visit to Working Well, a welfare to work programme in Manchester, co-
commissioned with the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), staff told us that the 
DWP believed that it was easier to run welfare to work nationally and the ‘joint bit’ of 
joint commissioning was missing. They also said that it was acting as a brake on what 
they wanted to do. Although still in its early stages, Working Well is, however, achieving 
high levels of success in getting its clients into work. When we asked the Minister for 
Employment, Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, whether she would like local areas to take the lead on 
future programmes, she said “We will work with them, obviously, in terms of co-design, 
commissioning and bringing together many of the potential services people need”92 and, 
later, that “It is working together. It is working in partnership”.93 There is an obvious 
difference between joint working and devolution, namely that devolution involves a 
transfer of responsibilities from, in this case, the DWP to a combined or local authority. 
With ‘joint working’, there is a risk that Departments will carry on without changing 
their practices. Devolution, on the other hand, leaves decision-making in the hands 
of local politicians, with accountability to local voters. We recommend that, where the 
terms ‘joint working’, ‘joint commissioning’ and ‘co-commissioning’ appear in a deal, 
they are challenged and defined in practical terms. In such cases, we would expect to 
see local areas actively involved in designing the project, performance management 
and its integration with existing local services. Joint working on or co-commissioning of 
services should be considered as a first step towards eventual fuller devolution.
43. With regards to other Government Departments, we heard from Cllr Derbyshire, 
Leader of Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council, that education is the “most 
frustrating” area.94 Her experience echoed Cllr Jeffrey’s comment that it was very difficult 
89 Q56
90 Sarah Ayres (DEV 006) para 2.2
91 Q269
92 Q221
93 Q222
94 Q56
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to get devolution of 16-to-18 further education in the Tees Valley deal95 and, of course, 
the evidence from Sarah Ayres above. Given that the current policy trend is for reduced 
involvement of local authorities in education, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect much 
commitment from the Department for Education to devolution.
44. The Devolution Bill is just one part of enabling devolution. There also needs to be 
an enthusiasm for it across all Government Departments and a commitment to it as the 
‘default position’, resulting in the devolution of substantial powers. Devolution should 
be as of right, not subject to the fluctuating enthusiasm of central government. The 
Devolution Bill should be seen as a first step towards a more comprehensive devolution 
framework for the whole of local government, covering significant spending and tax 
raising powers. Without this, economic growth, real public service reform, service 
integration, or any of the other objectives cited for devolution, will not be realised.
45. We would like to see a culture of devolution embedded in all Government 
Departments. The annual report on devolution, which is required under the Devolution 
Bill, should be prepared with input from a wide range of Departments, such as the DWP, 
the Department of Health, the Department for Education and the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. A section of this report, left unedited by Government, 
should comprise local authorities’ reports back on the Government’s commitment to 
devolution and rating their experience of different Departments, in terms of what 
the Department was like to work with and whether it fulfilled its part of the deal. The 
Committee will use the report as a means of scrutinising the Government, and it may 
also be of use to other stakeholders in holding the Government to account.
Government capacity
46. After the 4 September 2015 deadline for devolution proposals, the Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government announced that “38 areas have submitted proposals 
for devolved powers and budgets. We will work with every area over the coming months 
to negotiate transformational devolution deals”.96 Although an analysis of city deals, the 
evidence from the Centre for Urban and Economic Development Studies said that central 
government has found it “challenging from an institutional and individual capacity 
perspective—despite the creation of a specialist policy unit—to conduct simultaneous and 
complex negotiations with a large number of cities and city regions”.97 
47. By the time we came to take oral evidence, witnesses were able to comment on the 
progress of devolution deals. Ed Cox, the Director of IPPR North, said “The big problem we 
have seen in the deal-making process at the moment is that local authorities are expected 
to have bilateral conversations with lots of different departments” and said there should 
be a “cross-departmental team with which you can have a single conversation”.98 He also 
said:
Some Departments then renege when they hear what other Departments are 
doing. The Treasury holds the final veto on virtually anything that might have 
taken a long time to decide.99
95 Q168
96 HC Deb, 14 September 2015, col 739 [Commons Chamber]
97 Centre for Urban and Economic Development Studies (DEV 023) para 2.9
98 Q171
99 Q171
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When we asked the Minister about this, we were told that the Cities and Local Growth 
Unit was “cross-cutting across a lot of Departments” and took on a “large part of that 
coordinating work”.100 He said that:
In some of the deals, the Treasury has been a lead Department in terms of 
pulling it together, but in other deals, DCLG is very much taking on the role 
of seeing how we can get all the different pieces to add up. Because different 
areas ask for different packages, the challenge is that you cannot say, “This 
will always be the lead Department for every deal,” or, “This will always be the 
Department with which we work most closely.”101
All contact and communications about a deal with a local area should be made through 
the Cities and Local Growth Unit, regardless of which Department leads a deal. This 
would ensure consistency of approach across Government Departments and have the 
practical advantage of being a single channel of communication for local authorities.
48. Our evidence did not reveal particular concerns about the Government’s current 
capacity to negotiate deals; for example, in the Mayor of Liverpool’s experience, it had not 
been a major problem.102 However, witnesses speculated on what might happen when there 
were more deals under discussion. The Director of Core Cities, Chris Murray, pointed out 
that the bulk of the work might take place after the deal was agreed, saying “Even once a 
deal is signed, getting it through the system can still take an awful lot of work”.103 This was 
a concern for the Mayor of Liverpool, who said:
How we move forward after the deal. How we pull this together and deliver 
that. That is something that is a bit woolly, a little bit vague because clearly we 
are going to need more people, for instance, to deliver across the piece.104
The Chief Executive of Wakefield Council, Jane Roney, said:
I do think if we talk about 30 deals being negotiated with Treasury and a 
number of those having some degree of fiscal devolution attached to them in 
various models then there will be a challenge to try to capture this.105
Lord Kerslake, the Chair of the CfPS, doubted it would be possible to agree large numbers 
of bespoke deals and thought that, in these circumstances, “some form of framework” 
and “consistency of approach” was needed.106 Ed Cox suggested a “loose core settlement, 
basic framework or whatever you want to call it about the key elements you might want to 
have”.107 Chris Murray suggested:
We might take a moderate approach to using the deals that are being done 
now, say, for example, on skills or housing and understand how that works 
systemically within Whitehall and across its agencies and within local 
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government. Seeing if we can bank that as a model, so you are not starting 
everything from scratch every time when you come to negotiate and deliver 
future deals.108
49. We asked the Secretary of State whether he was confident that his Department 
had the capacity to negotiate all the deals coming forward. He said there was “a lot of 
excitement about it” in the Department109 and that “People are seeing it as part of their 
job and their role to engage in these negotiations”.110 We are not at all convinced that 
the Government will have the capacity to work through all the bids that have been 
submitted and also to return to agreed deals to negotiate additional powers and then 
go on to deal with a ‘second wave’ of devolution proposals at a later date. Extra capacity 
will also be required to consider the wider, long-term implications of devolution for 
the Government and how it will change its modus operandi to deal with these. While it 
appears that the work is currently being adequately resourced, the Government should 
make an explicit commitment to provide the necessary additional resources as the 
number of deals under negotiation increases and, as discussed at paragraph 27, work 
on more extensive devolution develops. A programme of secondments of staff from the 
Cities and Local Growth Unit to local authorities, and vice versa, would aid sharing of 
knowledge, best practice and understanding of the different environments.
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4 Bids, negotiation and agreement of 
deals: key themes
50. As we have discussed in paragraph 23 above, devolution in England is generally 
proceeding by means of deals negotiated and agreed between local areas and the 
Government. This is a pragmatic way forward but there are risks in deal-making which, to 
be mitigated, require the use of proper processes—we are all familiar with the drawbacks 
of ‘back room’ deals. Openness, transparency, agreement of a timeframe and equal 
influence between the parties will help to ensure the process and the deal agreed are both 
beyond reproach. The evidence we received suggested that the current process could be 
improved in a number of ways.
Public engagement
51. We have been struck by the lack of discussion and consultation with the public in 
areas which have proposed, negotiated and agreed devolution deals. At the question and 
answer session we held with residents during our visit to Greater Manchester, the vast 
majority of contributions, often made in angry tones, arose from the perceived lack of 
efforts by the combined authority to engage the public about the deal relating to their 
local area. While many valid points were made, we note that attendees, having elected to 
attend the session, were not necessarily representative of all Greater Manchester residents 
who are likely to be less aware of devolution. We were told that there had been a “complete, 
utter and total lack of democratic engagement”, “insufficient information” and that most 
people did not understand what Devo Manc was all about.111 When we raised this with our 
Greater Manchester witnesses, Cllr Kieran Quinn, the Leader of Tameside Metropolitan 
Borough Council, said he fully accepted there could have been more transparency.112 Cllr 
Sue Jeffrey, the Leader of Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council, told us that Tees Valley 
had not consulted the public before signing up to a deal113 and Cllr Alan Rhodes, Leader 
of Nottinghamshire County Council, said they were talking about the deal in the media 
and would hold a public consultation once it was agreed.114
52. Lord Kerslake, the Chair of the Centre for Public Scrutiny (CfPS), said that public 
engagement should take place both during “the process of coming to the deal” and then 
“having done the deal”.115 We think there is an additional initial stage which involves local 
areas consulting on devolution proposals before the negotiations begin. The seven week 
Government-set deadline for submitting bids did not provide any scope for this. We heard 
it was challenging even to consult the authorities involved and then agree proposals by 
this date.116 Local areas clearly felt they had to capitalise on the Government’s enthusiasm 
to get a deal done: explaining why Tees Valley did not undertake public engagement, Cllr 
Sue Jeffrey said:
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We were approached very quickly by James Wharton and co. to have a 
conversation about how the Tees Valley might like to move towards devolution, 
and we certainly saw it as being advantageous for us to get into that conversation 
quickly and to get on with that conversation.117
Cllr Quinn reasoned that, as the deal was bringing new powers to local people, not taking 
them away, limited public engagement could be excused.118 Ed Cox, the Director of IPPR 
North, commented that West Yorkshire was the only area that had undertaken public 
consultation and that their second deal had not yet been agreed. He believed that the 
Government had been trying to create a sense of momentum “in order to get deals done 
and to drive devolution down” which had inadvertently been to the detriment of public 
engagement.119 Some areas are taking steps to engage and consult residents. Durham 
County Council announced that it will poll Durham residents on the agreed North 
East Devolution Deal in early 2016120 and, demonstrating that the public is interested in 
devolution, a Citizen’s Assembly121 in Sheffield voted for a more ambitious deal than the 
one agreed.122
53. For devolution to take root and fulfil its aims, it needs to involve and engage the 
people it is designed to benefit. There has been a consistent very significant lack of 
public consultation, engagement and communication at all stages of the deal-making 
process. This is due to areas having limited time in the run up to the 4 September 
deadline. The Government drove the first wave of devolution deals through at a 
rapid pace (considered in more detail in the next section) which meant there was no 
opportunity for engagement with residents, or for residents to have their say on the 
principle of devolution or the framework of the specific deal proposed in their area. 
Despite this, we believe that local leaders could have communicated more effectively 
and extensively with their residents about the deal process, the contents of the deal and 
how it would affect them. It should, for example, have been clear to any citizen what 
their elected leaders were seeking to secure for the area in negotiating a devolution 
deal with the Government. In addition, deals involving complex negotiations between 
national and local politicians do not lend themselves to public engagement. However, 
from now on, efforts should be made to engage, consult and communicate with the 
public at all stages of the process—in the preparation of proposals, their negotiation 
and following agreement. Strategies to involve the public may include citizens’ juries, 
public meetings and, within the NHS and local government, staff engagement sessions. 
Once a deal is entrenched and its reforms have had the chance to take effect, the public 
should be consulted on their experience of its practical effects.
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54. We found that the negotiation process in particular had attracted strong criticism123 
and accusations that deals are being made in secret—the CfPS said the detail is being 
“thrashed out in private between a handful of privileged individuals”124—which has 
implications for openness and transparency. A member of the audience in Greater 
Manchester told us that she saw devolution as “one group of people in central London 
passing power to another group of elite people locally”.125 However, Lord Kerslake thought 
it would be very hard to make the process work if the negotiations were public.126 The 
impression we took from Greater Manchester was that the Government wanted the 
negotiations to be kept confidential, which necessarily limited public engagement. Cllr 
Quinn told us that “the Treasury wanted a deal signed before we could move into a more 
public domain” and Cllr Derbyshire, the Leader of Stockport Metropolitan Borough 
Council, echoed this.127 
55. In addition, the criteria used by the Government to judge the suitability of proposals 
have not been published. When we asked the Minister for Local Growth and the 
Northern Powerhouse how proposals were judged, he said the Government wanted to see 
cooperation, a desire to drive the devolution agenda and bottom-up agreement.128 
56. We think it is too late to engage the public only once a deal has been agreed. While 
it is reasonable that the actual negotiations are not open to the public, steps should be 
taken to inject more openness into the process by publishing on the relevant authorities’ 
websites:
• Devolution proposals and the Government’s counter-offers, within a reasonable 
time of them being made; 
• An outline of what is being negotiated; and
• Drafts of the deal, and the text of the final deal. 
The Government should also publish the criteria it uses to assess and agree proposals so 
local areas can refer to these when drawing up their devolution bid. A similar level of 
transparency should continue to be maintained once the deal has been agreed.
Timetable
57. The timetable for both proposing and agreeing deals has been very tight. In terms 
of putting forward bids, areas were given seven weeks to submit “formal, fiscally-neutral 
proposals and an agreed geography” to the Treasury by 4 September 2015129 so that they 
could be taken into account for the Spending Review. Our witnesses said this was a 
“narrow period of time”130 and described how places had rushed to complete bids within 
the timescales.131 It was suggested that the short deadline might have adversely affected 
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the quality of the proposals put forward. Lord Kerslake said he worried that some places 
“will be pushed into deals that really are not going to work and move them backwards 
rather than forwards”.132
58. We heard that, while timing was a challenge for urban areas, it was worse for non-
metropolitan areas as their deals involved many more institutions. South East England 
Councils (SEEC) said “The size, scale and variety of local authorities across the South 
East add to the time taken to agree far-reaching devolution proposals”, citing Hampshire 
Council’s deal involving one county council, three unitaries and 11 districts.133 The 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire devolution bid is similarly complex. Cllr Rhodes told us 
that “Getting 19 local authority leaders and their members through the departure gate at 
the same time has been an extremely challenging thing to try to do”.134  
59. According to a recent report by IPPR North, counties, in particular, need time to 
build trust and develop working relationships between partners.135 The County Councils 
Network said that the devolution agenda should respond intelligently to the particular 
circumstances of county and two-tier areas.136 We were therefore pleased to hear the 
Minister say:
Areas that take a bit longer may take a bit longer. There is no desire, certainly 
from my point of view, to close the door on devolution and “You did not reach 
an agreement in time. Therefore, we will refuse to talk to you again.”137
We also heard that, once the proposals had been submitted, there was no fixed or agreed 
timeframe for negotiations and so the Government tended to rush or bring forward 
deadlines. Cllr John Pollard, the Leader of Cornwall Council, said that the original plan 
had been to have the Cornish proposals ready before the summer recess but that:
The Chancellor told us, “Let’s see if we can do the deal before the summer 
recess,” which I must say was a bit of a shock to some of our officers, who had 
to produce a lot of detail, a lot of documentation, a lot of negotiation, in very 
short order, but we managed to do that. Therefore, at the end of July, we signed 
our deal.138
Cllr Jeffrey said that the Tees Valley devolution deal happened “very quickly”139 and that 
they found the various deadlines difficult:
At one stage, it was, “Can you do it by here?” and then, “Can you do it by the 
time of the Tory party conference?” and then, “Can you do it by the time of the 
comprehensive spending review?” There were a number of enforced deadlines, 
which put extra pressures on that perhaps would not have been there otherwise, 
but at the end of the day we did as well as we could.140
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60. The Government is moving devolution forward at a rapid pace, which is welcome. 
However, some areas, particularly non-metropolitan areas, found it very challenging to 
meet the 4 September deadline. There is a risk that they may be rushing into bids which 
have not been properly planned and are based on relationships with neighbouring 
areas which have not had sufficient time to bed down. The Government also appears 
to be setting deadlines in accordance with events in the parliamentary and political 
calendar. We welcome the Secretary of State’s acknowledgement that some areas may 
take longer than others to submit bids and recommend that any deadlines imposed 
should take this into account. Then, once a bid has been submitted and negotiation 
on the content of the deal begins, the parties should decide on an agreed and prompt 
timeframe, with fixed deadlines, not influenced by political criteria, for negotiation 
and agreement of the deal. It is essential that this takes into account the time needed to 
undertake consultation and engagement with the public.
61. In addition, in accordance with the evidence given by the Minister, we suggest that 
the Government makes a clear statement that devolution will take place at different 
speeds in different places, and that taking time to craft a proposal to take account of 
local specificities will not adversely affect the Government’s response to it. This would 
encourage areas to spend longer building relationships, preparing proposals and 
consulting residents, and would be particularly beneficial for non-metropolitan areas.
Balancing central and local influence
62. The Treasury and, to a lesser extent, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government are driving devolution; this is inevitable at the outset, since devolution is a 
central government policy. However, when it comes to deal-making, there is an important 
balance to be struck between the influence that the Government has on a deal and the 
influence the local area has. From what we have heard, the Government appears to have 
the upper hand, seen in the way it prescribes the content of deals and sets the deadlines 
and, as our witnesses confirmed, requires that local areas adopt elected mayors in return 
for a full package of devolved powers.141 The recommendations we made above—
encouraging devolution at different speeds and setting out a timeframe—would provide 
a clear process for parties to follow and would help to counter the perception that the 
Government is exerting too much influence over the deal-making process.
63. We have also detected the sense among non-metropolitan areas that the Government’s 
devolution policy is biased towards city regions; for example, Essex County Council said 
that the main focus to date had been on city regions142 and SEEC called for devolution to 
be significantly extended outside the cities.143 With the exception of Cornwall, the deals 
agreed to date have all been with urban areas and the Government’s rhetoric has often 
focused on devolution to cities to the exclusion of other areas.144 Furthermore, Cornwall 
is not representative of non-metropolitan areas: the New Local Government Network said 
that it was “an outlier in terms of geography, funding, economic conditions and governance 
(being a unitary) and cannot be taken as a model for anywhere else”.145 Other witnesses 
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also mentioned a “little bit of urban bias early on in the process”146 and the process being 
“controlled by that at the moment”147 but also said that an initial focus on city regions 
was appropriate if the key objective of devolution was economic growth.148 However, in 
its written evidence, the Department did mention devolution to “local areas—rural or 
urban, cities, towns, or counties”.149 It is often argued that urban areas are increasingly 
the source of the highest levels of economic innovation and growth and that, if the 
objective is economic rebalancing, this requires greater devolution to city regions. 
We understand and sympathise with this approach. Nevertheless, the agreement of 
a devolution deal with a non-metropolitan two-tier area would help to address any 
sense that the Government is biased towards devolution to city regions. The next non-
metropolitan deal will therefore be particularly significant and we look forward to one 
being agreed in the next six months.
64. According to Professor Copus of De Montfort University, non-urban areas can gain 
from a devolution agenda focused on cities.150 He argued that the benefits of better urban 
economic performance eventually spread beyond the administrative boundaries of urban 
areas to be reaped by non-metropolitan areas. This is clearly already the case for London 
and large areas of the South East. Nevertheless, we are concerned that this will not be 
the case for small towns and county areas outside the South East which risk being left 
out and left behind. The Government should consider this a major issue and monitor 
the impact of devolution deals on adjoining or nearby areas to assess whether such areas 
are benefitting or being left behind.
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5 Governance and accountability
65. The Devolution Bill provides for the creation of directly-elected mayors and 
requires combined authorities to have in place overview and scrutiny arrangements. 
The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) referred to this as a 
“framework” for governance which allows for stronger arrangements to be created by 
secondary legislation.151 The Centre for Public Scrutiny (CfPS), however, argued that 
requiring elected mayors and overview and scrutiny committees may lead to combined 
authorities approaching governance as a “matter of compliance, where no further thought 
is required”.152 It also said that the approach taken to governance was “one-size-fits-all” 
and that one form of governance will not be equally appropriate in all areas.153 The New 
Local Government Network was similarly concerned that governance and accountability 
would not receive the attention required due to the sheer pace of the devolution process.154 
Directly-elected mayors
66. The Government has consistently linked directly-elected mayors to devolving a full 
package of powers to local areas, particularly cities,155 and has articulated two reasons 
for this; “proper democratic direct accountability”156 for the powers being devolved and 
the “success of international city and metro mayors”, such as Rahm Emanuel, the Mayor 
of Chicago, Rudy Giuliani in New York, Bertrand Delanoë in Paris and London’s Boris 
Johnson.157 We were told, however, that only about four of the 15 international mayors that 
are held up as examples by the Government are “genuinely directly elected”.158
Attitudes to directly-elected mayors
67. The Government’s policy on elected mayors has attracted a great deal of attention, 
so much so that one of our witnesses said that “all our concerns and energies have been 
focused on the elected mayor issue and not on wider issues of local democracy”.159 The 
submissions we received did not come down overwhelmingly for or against elected mayors. 
Indeed, much of the evidence supported elected mayors160 as a means of providing visible 
leadership and accountability. Several times, though, we heard that local areas should be 
free to decide whether an elected mayor was the right model of governance for their area.161
68. The witnesses who had been involved in negotiating deals for their local areas had a 
pragmatic attitude to having an elected mayor. The Chief Executive of Wakefield Council, 
Jane Roney, saw extra devolved powers as worth having in return for an elected mayor.162 
Cllr Sue Jeffrey, the Leader of Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council, said that, for the 
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Tees Valley, “It is a price we are having to have, so we will make it work”.163 They had 
decided their mayor would be a figurehead for inward investment, economic development 
and skills and someone you “pick the phone up and talk to if you want to do business 
with the Tees Valley”.164 Cllr Kieran Quinn, Leader of Tameside Metropolitan Borough 
Council, said that the elected mayor in Greater Manchester was a “trade off” in return 
for more powers165 but also acknowledged that s/he would be a “go-to voice for Greater 
Manchester”.166 However, when we asked the Greater Manchester leaders whether they 
would have accepted an alternative to an elected mayor, they said ‘yes’ without hesitation.167
Non-metropolitan areas
69. Whatever the deal on offer, elected mayors were much less acceptable to non-
metropolitan areas. Cllr John Pollard, the Leader of Cornwall Council, told us there was 
no appetite for a directly elected mayor anywhere in Cornwall.168 Cllr Paul Carter, the 
Chair of the County Councils Network, said he hoped the vast majority of the members 
of his organisation would be very concerned about elected mayors.169 We heard that the 
geography of an area played a part in whether a mayor was suitable. South East England 
Councils said that the “scale, geography, mix of unitary and two-tier councils and variation 
between urban and rural areas in the South East mean there is little support for elected 
mayors”.170 Ed Cox, the Director of IPPR North, thought that elected mayors could work 
in non-metropolitan areas with a single urban centre but said that:
That does not pertain in most non-metropolitan areas, where you have 
multiple centres of economic activity. Very often, if we are talking about places 
like Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, you have a very weak single identity or 
multiple identities, modest powers being offered and already quite complex 
arrangements. In those circumstances, it is not necessarily ideal to have a 
metro mayor.171
The Government clearly expects cities to accept an elected mayor, but whether this is 
also expected of non-metropolitan areas is less clear. We asked the Minister for Local 
Growth and the Northern Powerhouse, James Wharton MP, whether, after Cornwall, 
non-metropolitan areas would still be expected to have a mayor but he would only say:
We have been very clear that where metropolitan and more urban areas want 
a package of powers akin to that in Greater Manchester, there will be an 
expectation that a mayor is part of the package. Of course, devolution is a 
voluntary process. No area is forced to do it but, when they want those sorts 
of significant packages, the expectation that a mayor will be part of it is a 
reasonable one.172
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IPPR North has called for the Government to “accept (or deny) that an elected mayor might 
not be the best model of governance for counties” and “demonstrate genuine openness 
to alternative models”.173 The Leader of Cornwall said that their alternative model “of a 
strong leader, a cabinet and accountability to full council, full council being the sovereign 
body” worked for Cornwall.174 
70. International comparisons aside, we heard evidence that there are benefits to be 
gained from having an elected mayor; for example leadership, strong accountability 
and a ‘go to’ voice for business. However, we believe elected mayors are likely to be better 
suited to urban areas. The scale, geography and economic diversity of non-metropolitan 
areas mean elected mayors are unlikely to be an easy fit. Local areas should be allowed 
to decide whether or not they wish to have an elected mayor. Those which do not want 
an elected mayor, but nonetheless want substantial devolved powers, should be allowed 
to propose an equally strong alternative model of governance.
71. Cllr Carter identified another issue with elected mayors in non-metropolitan areas: 
We are in danger of having four tiers of government. We have towns and 
parishes; we have districts and boroughs; and we have the county. Do we need 
another tier of governance on top of that, through a directly elected mayor’s 
office? I do not think we do.175
When we asked the Minister whether four tiers of local government was too many, he 
said:
It might be; it might not. It is not for me, as part of the devolution process, to 
tell areas how many tiers of government they should have. Of course, there is 
scope for areas to look at rationalisation of government, again by agreement, 
and to have the sort of model they want to have.176
In fact, where a combined authority has been created, the mayor could be seen as a 
fifth tier of local government. Aside from the potential for confusion, which we 
discuss below, we think that the public will probably be left feeling that there is too 
much bureaucracy and too many politicians. There is a risk that this could lead to 
low turnouts at mayoral elections, which would have implications for the democratic 
legitimacy of elected mayors. This is a consequence that needs to be addressed in the 
long-term, possibly by a move to having more unitary authorities. 
Scrutiny
72. The Devolution Bill requires each combined authority to establish at least one overview 
and scrutiny committee, consisting of backbench councillors from the constituent 
councils, to review and scrutinise its decisions and actions and those of the elected mayor. 
The CfPS was critical, saying that this system will not be appropriate for every combined 
authority:
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Committees bringing together councillors from a range of authorities, who 
may be geographically dispersed over a large area, can be very difficult to 
manage; areas may be able to develop governance approaches which may be 
more proportionate and effective.177
73. The CfPS believes that better governance could be developed and agreed upon as a 
result of discussions at local level.178 Lord Kerslake, the CfPS’ Chair, described how this 
could happen:
Each area, each combined authority, should develop a clear governance 
framework that is mutually agreed across the key partners. That should address 
explicitly the issues of how overview and scrutiny will work, how those who 
are not councillors can contribute to that debate, and how this will be reviewed 
and refreshed over time. You would not set out a single model of how it should 
be done, but you would require the local leadership to consciously address the 
issue, agree between them how it is going to work and, indeed, hold with that 
model and agree changes only through the overview and scrutiny committee.179
74. Other witnesses saw scrutiny as an opportunity to use creative ways to reinvigorate 
local democracy; for example, Ed Cox suggested combined authorities could have second 
chambers made up of people from the business and voluntary and community sector 
and citizens’ panels.180 Cllr Pollard described how Cornwall was involving their MPs, 
as well as the council, in monitoring.181 The Greater Manchester leaders told us that 
scrutiny arrangements there had improved as a result of devolution; Cllr Quinn said that 
“devolution has slowed down our process of governance to make sure that what we are 
now governing is far stronger and robust”.182
75. In the Tees Valley, we heard that it is intended that the mayor will be part of a team 
and would be “working collectively with the [council] leaders”.183 However, Lord Kerslake 
thought that “it would be unwise to assume that directly elected mayors will simply be 
quasi leaders. They could well establish a profile and a position that is well beyond that”.184 
Darren Johnson, the Chair of the London Assembly, reflected on the need for robust 
scrutiny arrangements to hold the mayor to account:
Once you have an individual who is elected, who comes in with their own 
agenda and the electorate vote in someone with a very powerful mandate, the 
dynamic changes altogether. Whatever is written down on the agreement in 
paper as part of the deal could really change once you have a real live person 
in office who has made some genuine pledges to the electorate and been voted 
in on those. It changes the dynamic enormously, which is why the scrutiny 
arrangements are crucial in this.185
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Sir Edward Lister, the Deputy Mayor of London, described the effects of being subject to 
robust scrutiny, saying “It always sharpens one up” and “makes us think very carefully 
about the budgets as we put them through as we do need one third of the assembly to 
support the Mayor”.186 
76. Several of our witnesses highlighted the issue of resourcing for scrutiny. Professor 
Colin Copus of De Montfort University commented that local authority scrutiny receives 
less resources and support than executives.187 Cllr Sue Jeffrey said:
What makes overview and scrutiny work is resources. It has to be properly 
resourced. The thing that concerns me about the combined authorities is the 
level of resource that is going to be available to them to do jobs like overview 
and scrutiny going forward. If it is going to be expected to do it on a shoestring, 
it is going to make that very difficult.188
77. As the DCLG says, the overview and scrutiny requirements in the Bill are an 
initial framework to be used as a basis for more robust provisions, which we believe 
have a role in fostering public confidence in the new arrangements, as well as balancing 
vested interests. These should be developed to suit the characteristics of the local areas 
as a result of deliberate efforts to hold active discussions at local level, with residents 
involved in designing new and more open methods of scrutiny. Local areas need to give 
active consideration to how the mayor will work with the council leaders and how s/he 
will be held to account. Although the elected mayor is intended to be a ‘first among 
equals’, s/he may soon establish, or already have, a profile and position which makes 
this balance difficult to achieve.
Potential for confusion
78. From what we have seen and heard, we are very concerned that the public will not 
understand who will be responsible for what in their local area. The Devolution Bill makes 
a distinction between the powers of the mayor and those of the combined authority which 
translates into the mayor and the combined authority being responsible for different 
services. For example, in Greater Manchester, the interim mayor is responsible for 
transport, but not health, which is within Greater Manchester Combined Authority’s 
remit. Some witnesses argued that this is not a problem in London where the Mayor of 
London’s responsibilities differ from those of the London Boroughs.189 But Alexandra 
Jones, the Chief Executive of the Centre for Cities, said this will need to be tackled as 
part of the “public education programme” around devolution190 and Professor Copus said 
that “the mayor, counties and the districts have to be prepared to point people in the 
right direction”.191 When we put our concerns to the Secretary of State for Communities 
and Local Government, he said that it would be “for that mayor to make very clear the 
platform on which they stand and the things they are doing in office”.192 
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79. There will be a complex division of responsibility between local authorities, the 
combined authority and the elected mayor which will not necessarily be apparent to 
the public. However, as the figurehead, people are going to hold the elected mayor 
accountable, regardless of whether or not s/he has responsibility. As a result, careful 
thought needs to be given to determining the division of responsibility in a way that 
provides a coherent set of powers and makes sense to the public; this should be an 
integral part of the deal-making process with the division of responsibilities written 
into the deal.
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6 Health devolution
80. We had many questions about health devolution: whether it is in fact devolution at 
all, whether it is necessary, how it will mesh with existing integration initiatives, how 
it will impact on funding and how it will affect accountability in what is already a very 
complex set of arrangements. It has been difficult to identify what it means in practice 
and what it might entail for other areas. The tone of the evidence we received was fairly 
cautious. We understand that, of the 38 bids submitted to the Government, around 
half include requests relating to health and social care.193 The Devolution Bill aids joint 
decision making between local authorities and Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) 
by enabling joint commissioning boards to take on commissioning functions and financial 
resources and enabling combined or local authorities to take on or concurrently or jointly 
exercise functional responsibilities from a public authority. The NHS Confederation said 
that the Devolution Bill could potentially allow local areas to have “much greater control 
over the planning and delivery of services currently outside the remit of local authorities 
and NHS CCGs”194 and this gives them “a new opportunity to do things differently and 
take a broader focus”.195
81. It is widely recognised that individuals with long-term complex care needs can 
‘fall through the gaps’ between services. Over the years, various initiatives, focusing 
particularly on the integration of health and social care services, have attempted to 
address this problem, with some success. The evidence we received suggested that, when 
successful initiatives of this kind are in place, formal health devolution may not add much. 
NHS Providers said:
A great deal has already been achieved (for example, in pooling budgets) 
without needing a devolution deal. Therefore, for some, approaches which do 
not require formal devolution—based, for example, on closer joint working 
arrangements—may be more appropriate.196
In addition, the NHS Confederation said:
Many of the freedoms and mechanisms enabling leaders to design the system 
around local needs and to pool resources already exist and are being made full 
use of by both NHS and local authorities.197
82. On these grounds, we asked our witnesses whether health devolution was necessary. 
Rob Webster, the Chief Executive of the NHS Confederation, said “not everywhere” and 
gave Sheffield as example of a place which has chosen to further its existing arrangements, 
rather than make health devolution part of its deal.198 However, this may be due to the fact 
that Sheffield’s health system is less complicated than Greater Manchester’s and, therefore, 
implementing change is achievable without devolution. Ian Williamson, the Chief Officer 
for Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Devolution, said there was a case for 
“transformational improvement” in Greater Manchester and that devolution was an 
“opportunity to concentrate on the place of Greater Manchester, rather than just allowing 
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the existing systems and organisations to carry on in a way that is not as coherent as it can 
be”.199 Rob Webster also emphasised the need to find solutions for health and wellbeing 
in the context of the place people live.200 The Minister of State for Community and Social 
Care, Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP, also indicated that the focus of health devolution was on 
the particular locality, suggesting:
If you give an impetus through local devolution to the work that is already 
going on to integrate health services, you are releasing, as best you can, as 
much local knowledge as possible about what people need in their particular 
area, how people would like to handle the finances and what priorities they 
want to make.201
This seemed to accord with Greater Manchester’s experience of health devolution creating 
an energy and positivity in finding solutions202 and speeding up difficult conversations and 
planning.203 The NHS Confederation also said that it has acted as “an important catalyst” 
to having “difficult conversations about how best to plan and deliver joined up services”.204 
This is a real benefit because, as the Chairman of the County Councils Network said, there 
is evidence of reluctance to change on the part of the NHS.205 
83. We were also interested to understand how health devolution would fit in with existing 
initiatives to integrate health and social care, such as the Better Care Fund, the Integrated 
Care Pioneer Programme and new care model pilots. Ian Williamson told us that the 
pilots in Greater Manchester were working closely with the devolution programme and 
would be replicated and built on throughout the city region. He also said that the size and 
footprint of the area meant that best practice could be easily disseminated across the local 
health system.206 However, the NHS Confederation said:
Various new models are already being set up in many different places. It is 
important that national and local leaders do not become overly focused on 
formal devolution agreements and fail to use existing or more appropriate 
means of pooling resources and sharing decision-making, which may better 
suit their needs.207 
The Minister said that “devolution complements what is already going on and provides a 
further route for the integration of services”.208 He also said that he did not expect areas 
to put forward plans for devolution unless they have “pretty good ideas” about what they 
want to achieve.209  
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84. Witnesses from Greater Manchester were clear that their aim was to make the best 
use of the money available.210 NHS Providers, however, thought that it was “not clear that 
pooled budgets or devolved arrangements will necessarily release efficiency savings”.211 
On the impact on funding, the NHS Confederation said that health devolution would 
“not be the single panacea or silver bullet to solve the finances of either health or social 
care”212 and, until this happened, their members feared that the effect of health devolution 
would be to make a national funding problem a local one.213 The Minister hoped that 
health devolution would help with the funding challenges, although he did not suggest 
that it would solve them:
The work we are trying to do in relation to greater integration of local authority 
and NHS services is predicated on the fact that the more you can bring services 
together, the more likely it will be that you will find the sort of efficiencies 
everyone is looking for in the delivery and the provision of services anyway.214 
On our visit to Greater Manchester, we were told that there was no need to use the powers 
set out in the Devolution Bill to transfer health functions to the Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority and that there would be no separation from the NHS.215 Ian 
Williamson explained that in his area “The chief officer for devolution […] will be an 
employee of NHS England, and therefore the line of accountability will flow up through 
NHS England to the Department of Health”.216 The Minister said that arrangements in 
Greater Manchester were a mixture of both delegation and devolution217 and, referring 
to amendments made in the House of Lords, emphasised that the Devolution Bill did not 
allow the Secretary of State and the NHS to completely devolve responsibilities. We are 
unpersuaded by the use of the word ‘devolution’ to describe what is happening to health 
in Greater Manchester: it actually appears to involve delegation of responsibilities or joint 
working.
85. Health devolution has great potential. In the context of some areas, such as Greater 
Manchester, it is a necessary step to design health and care to suit the circumstances 
of a particular place, to speed up and enhance existing work on integration and 
help address the cultural challenges posed by joint working for the NHS and local 
government. In other areas, however, health devolution may not be needed in the short 
term to advance and improve health and social care. But, to achieve a great deal more 
in the longer term, real devolution and a transfer of more power to local government 
is needed.
86. However, health devolution has arrived at a particularly difficult time for the 
health and social care system and its staff: there has been significant structural change 
in recent years and there is now an unprecedented level of financial challenge. With 
such uncertainty, we are concerned about the long-term consequences and recommend 
that, over an appropriate timescale, the Government gathers evidence on the impact 
of these reforms. It is important that areas should not pursue formal health devolution 
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at the expense of health and social care initiatives with similar aims that are proving 
fruitful. Areas that do wish to pursue health devolution must have clearly defined 
objectives for what they expect it to deliver. 
87. We were struck by the level of concern shown by the attendees of our question and 
answer session in Manchester about the lack of public consultation on the changes to 
health in the city. A representative of the Royal College of Nursing said that nurses and 
healthcare assistants in the North West did not understand what devolution was and what 
it entailed.218 Rob Webster told us that, according to an NHS Confederation survey, only 
40 per cent of people knew or understood enough about the NHS to discuss changes to 
the health services and this meant that “we are starting from a position where we always 
need to communicate clearly and well, and engage with people over time”. He added that:
If this is about driving better outcomes, having clinical leadership and support 
for change, and being accountable to the local public, then we need to make 
sure that those tests are passed in all the changes that we make.219
We agree. We discussed some of the reasons why public engagement was limited in Greater 
Manchester in chapter 4 and were pleased to hear that there are plans for public sessions 
on health devolution in 2016.220 We reiterate, however, that, from now on, the public must 
be engaged, consulted and communicated with throughout the devolution process and 
once a deal has been agreed. Public engagement is particularly important in the case of 
health devolution where the complexity of the systems in place make understanding the 
consequences of change more difficult in an area where the public’s response is likely to 
be more emotional. 
88. In this context, we are concerned about accountability in situations like that in 
Greater Manchester where the elected mayor will act as a public figurehead, without 
formal responsibility for health and social care. As well as redirecting complaints, Mr 
Williamson said that the Greater Manchester Combined Authority would need to 
communicate clearly to people about how the arrangements would work and that:
We think that these arrangements add to transparency and accountability at 
a local level. For example, holding meetings of our new strategic partnership 
board with all the 37 organisations in public will aid that accountability and 
transparency.221 
Accountability in health and social care is already extremely complex and further 
changes, such as the creation of an elected mayor, are likely to leave patients feeling 
confused about who they should approach for information or to pursue complaints. 
Any health devolution agreement should be accompanied by plans for how the changes 
taking place will be communicated to residents. Residents should be informed about the 
new structures and responsibilities and be told where to go for information and advice 
and to make complaints.
218 Communities and Local Government Committee, Public question and answer session in Greater Manchester, 26 
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89. Considerable concern has been expressed about whether health services in areas with 
devolution deals would remain subject to national standards. Clause 19, inserted into the 
Devolution Bill in the House of Lords, confirms the continuation of NHS accountabilities 
and the regulatory responsibilities of the Care Quality Commission, Monitor and others 
under devolved arrangements. When we asked about accountability for services, the 
Minister told us:
Depending on which bit is under pressure, the buck stops with providers for 
providing services and they remain responsible under a devolved process, as 
they would anywhere else. […] But the Secretary of State remains responsible 
for the core duties of the NHS and how they are carried out. […] The buck 
remains with those who currently have the responsibility for the services or 
who will be commissioning the services. Locally, electorally, a new devolved 
authority or a combined authority will need to answer to their own electorate 
as to how they are running services and in what configuration, but in terms 
of quality and standards, we have made very sure that the regulatory regime 
remains the same as it is and, ultimately on NHS services, the buck stops with 
the Secretary of State.222
We found this explanation confusing. It is unclear to us how accountability will work 
in practice.
90. In terms of regulation, we heard that regulatory bodies, such as Monitor and the NHS 
Trust Development Authority, would adapt to regulate the devolved area and make sure 
their powers covered the “wider footprint of the areas that will be commissioning and 
providing”.223 However, it would appear that their powers do not extend to regulating a 
local authority’s financial contribution to a pooled budget and it was not clear which 
body was in fact responsible for checking their financial position. There is also a 
lack of clarity about the audit and regulation of pooled budgets and, in particular, 
oversight of the sustainability of local authorities’ contributions.224 Again, we were 
left feeling that the arrangements the Minister described were more aspirational than 
a thought-through and watertight system of financial regulation.225 There is a need 
for a clear articulation of how health devolution will work and for clear governance 
arrangements set out in a way that residents, patients and staff can understand. This 
will ensure there is no adverse impact on the quality of local services and that services 
are accountable. We are not satisfied that there has been sufficient consideration as 
to how pooled budgets will be regulated and audited and how they will be handled 
in practice. Unless this is carefully considered, we risk both not having the flexibility 
to use budgets to reflect local priorities and facilitate joint working and replicating 
locally the silos that exist at national level. This applies to services devolved from all 
Government Departments, not just health. We would like the Government to revisit 
this issue on an ongoing basis as health devolution is rolled out and embedded in local 
areas.
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91. Our evidence revealed several other issues to be kept in mind in the health devolution 
context. Firstly, the need for better sharing of information between Government 
Departments, the NHS and local government, such as information from the Department 
of Work and Pensions (DWP) about local people in receipt of Attendance Allowance, 
which is payable to people with care and support needs. If the DWP kept authorities 
informed about their residents in receipt of this benefit, they would be better able to 
predict and plan for those needing social care. We appreciate that privacy issues often 
create difficulties for data sharing but were encouraged to hear the Minister say that it 
was a key part of the integration of local services.226 The Government should set out the 
steps it will take to ensure the relevant Departments share data, for example relating to 
Attendance Allowance, with the NHS and local authorities. 
92. In addition, the treatment of specialised services under devolution was drawn to 
our attention by patient groups concerned that, in taking responsibility for specialised 
services,227 local areas may give preference to services with greater economic impact. Mr 
Williamson told us that, from Greater Manchester’s point of view, this would enable them 
to make “more sensible joined-up decisions” and ensure that patients are treated as soon as 
possible and that NHS England would continue to take responsibility for rare conditions.228 
We asked them to explain in detail how they intended to manage these services and, while 
we were satisfied with the plans we received,229 we highlight this as an issue which needs 
to be carefully monitored in emerging health devolution agreements.
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7 London
93. Devolution to London, which occurred in 2000, has been a success. The Department 
for Communities and Local Government said it “has succeeded in improving policy 
outcomes across a number of different areas”.230 The Chair of the London Assembly, 
Darren Johnson, extolled London’s track record, saying it has been a “phenomenal success”.231 
Our witnesses were not particularly concerned by the fact that the Devolution Bill did not 
apply to London, seeing it as a means of allowing other places to catch up. However, they 
all mentioned the current negotiations with the Government for new powers relating, for 
example, to skills and health.232 The Chief Executive of London Councils, John O’Brien, 
described how, with the Greater London Authority, the boroughs had submitted a set 
of proposals for further devolution and public service reform to the Government by the 
4 September deadline.233 He said that, rather than a “big bang further London deal”, 
there would be an important piece of public service reform.234 The Secretary of State 
for Communities and Local Government said he was “not only open to, but in regular 
discussion with the leaders of London […] about what further powers can be given to what 
is clearly a very successful city”.235
Fiscal devolution
94. We heard about the challenges faced by London. The Deputy Mayor of London, Sir 
Edward Lister, said that London’s population was growing at a rate of just under 100,000 
people a year and that “a lot is needed in London, in infrastructure and other things” to 
sustain that level of growth.236 The Chief Executive of London Councils said:
Clearly the level of growth in London does demand a sustainable model 
for investing to support that growth in terms of physical growth and hard 
infrastructure, but also soft infrastructure—things like school places […] It 
also requires reforming public services in a way that will make them fit for the 
purpose of the challenge we face around care and health integration.237
Our witnesses pointed to several reasons why fiscal devolution to the capital was necessary. 
Sir Edward Lister said that:
[Housing and infrastructure is what] we desperately need money for and the bit 
that we need to be able borrow and have certainty about. If we have certainty 
on funding, we can sort these things out, but when we are operating on penny 
packets of money from Government and in relatively short timelines, we can 
never assemble the kind of cash that we are going to need in order to grow 
the city. My argument is all about fiscal devolution for capital, not for revenue 
purposes.238
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95. Our other witnesses and many of the written submissions we received also called 
for the devolution of greater fiscal powers to London and for the recommendations 
of the London Finance Commission (‘the Commission’) to be implemented.239 The 
Commission, which was established in July 2012 by the Mayor of London, concluded that, 
by comparison with other international cities, London had little control over its finances. 
The Commission recommended that the Greater London Authority and the boroughs 
should be allowed to borrow against their assets and income and that London should be 
allowed to design a property tax regime for its unique circumstances. Our predecessors 
considered the Commission’s report as part of its 2013-14 inquiry on fiscal devolution 
and came down strongly in favour of devolution of funds to cities and city regions.240 Our 
witnesses welcomed the Government’s announcement that business rates would be fully 
devolved. The Chief Executive of London Councils commented that a very large amount 
of responsibility could potentially accrue to London but also noted the need to address 
equalisation with the rest of the country.241 Sir Edward Lister said that the certainty of the 
funding stream produced by business rates would be advantageous for large infrastructure 
projects in the future.242 
96. Devolution to London was successful because it enabled the city to meet the 
key challenges it faced in 2000. Sixteen years on, London faces a series of additional 
challenges including housing and skills, which are not addressed by the existing 
devolution framework. London is therefore not only ready for further devolution, but 
urgently needs it. In keeping with the recommendations of our predecessors, we believe 
fiscal devolution is essential to London’s continuing success. The scale of growth of service 
demand alone in London requires significant investment in infrastructure for which 
fiscal devolution is required. We also heard about the importance of London’s continuing 
success for the national economy and that “the emergence of a Northern Powerhouse, and 
stronger cities elsewhere in the UK, will only be achieved by continued investment in the 
capital”.243 
Subregional devolution
97. John O’Brien said London’s governance structure required “a route […] for devolution 
and delegations that work for groupings of authorities”.244 He added that:
Some pieces of reform and devolution need to happen at a smaller scale. Some 
of the proposals around health or getting people back into work clearly are 
going to operate at a lower geographical scale than the whole of pan-London, 
and some of them will happen locally.245
Indeed, groupings of London boroughs, for example the ‘South London Partnership’, 
have put forward a number of plans for subregional devolution within London (to which 
the Mayor of London is a co-signatory), although they have not been formally published. 
239 See, for example, Core Cities (DEV 014) para 5.2, the Centre for Cities (DEV 031), the London Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (DEV 015) para 8 and the Mayor of London (DEV 042) 
240 Communities and Local Government Committee, First Report of Session 2014-15, Devolution in England: the case for 
local government, HC 503
241 Q198 [Mr J O’Brien]
242 Q198 [Sir Edward Lister]
243 Mayor of London [DEV 042] para 6
244 Q192 
245 Q200 [Mr J O’Brien]
44  Devolution: the next five years and beyond 
Their proposals include devolving power to commission employment support to groups of 
boroughs; devolving small business support to redesigning probation, court services, youth 
offending and community rehabilitation; pooling of health, social care and public health 
budgets. Sir Edward Lister said that devolution of health in London was particularly far 
advanced and that, based around clusters of hospitals, it would be subregional by nature.246 
He said that he was “quite comfortable with having, regional, subregional and local”.247 
We also heard that the level to which things would be devolved would be approached case-
by-case with a view to what made most sense: for example, John O’ Brien said:
Skills commissioning is going to work formally at a pan-London level, but 
informed by the intelligence that comes from groupings of boroughs and 
subregional economies. Employment support—getting people furthest from 
the labour market back into work—probably is going to be for subregional 
groupings of boroughs. The health propositions that we have been working on 
jointly operate at all of those different spatial levels.248 
He concluded by adding “London has to recognise that complexity—there is no way out 
of it—and needs to adapt the way it manages that in that context”.249 The reality of London 
was its arrangements would be “messier and more complex” than other smaller urban 
areas.250 We agree that, depending on what makes most sense, certain types of reform 
and devolution in London will and should happen at regional or subregional level and 
that arrangements will be more complicated than in other areas. However, there is a 
real risk of confusion for the public, and indeed for officers, in having three levels of 
governance and particular efforts should be given to avoiding such confusion. 
The Mayor of London and the London Assembly
98. Our London witnesses were enthusiastic about the impact the Mayor of London 
has had on the city. We heard that the mayoralty provides a “strong voice for London”,251 
and “an ambassador”,252 was an “advantage and an asset [with] convening power and 
visibility”253 which also had had the ability to take on opponents and bring in reforms like 
the Congestion Charge and the low emission zone.254 The Chair of the London Assembly 
said that London’s size also played a role in the success of the London Mayor, saying:
London has been big enough as a political entity to really make an impact. 
There are economies of scale on a strategic level. […] Having one for Greater 
London as a whole means that there are the economies of scale to lever in 
investment, negotiate with Government and to co-ordinate.255
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99. The evidence we heard accorded with our predecessors’ conclusions about the office of 
Mayor of London: they described the operation of the London Assembly and the division 
of powers between it and the Mayor in 2013 and said it was a “local government success 
story”.256
100. London’s governance arrangements are different from those in the Devolution Bill 
which, as discussed in chapter 5, sets out a ‘first among equals’ mayoral model, with 
overview and scrutiny committees made up of councillors from the constituent councils. 
The London Assembly, on the other hand, is a separate body with a democratic mandate 
to scrutinise the Mayor on behalf of all Londoners. Perhaps not surprisingly, the London 
Assembly’s Chair described it as a crucial formal check and balance on the London Mayor 
and scrutineer of the forward plan.257 He said that the London Assembly had genuinely 
added value to the governance of London and that, for example, during the Olympics 
“it had helped put the pressure on—having a very high profile body like the Assembly, 
which can get on the evening news, asking these awkward questions”.258 Sir Edward 
Lister also had praise for the London Assembly, saying that it worked and that he was 
“totally supportive of it”.259 Sir Edward thought London’s scrutiny arrangements would 
be sufficient to cope with more devolved powers,260 but Darren Johnson identified various 
ways in which these arrangements could be strengthened: call-in powers over mayoral 
decisions, the Mayor’s Police and Crime Plan made subject to veto, the power to reject 
mayoral appointments and the power to summon witnesses from other public agencies.261 
John O’Brien also suggested that scrutiny arrangements in the London Boroughs and 
the London Assembly as a whole might need to be revisited following receipt of more 
devolved powers.262 But we heard that scrutiny was not well developed and was being 
carried out through boroughs’ individual arrangements.263
101. Both the current Mayor of London and his predecessor have been judged to be 
successful in their role. It remains to be seen whether elected mayors for combined 
authorities are similarly successful. Not having the same profile, they are unlikely to 
enjoy the same level of influence and leverage as the Mayor of London. However, the 
office does demonstrate what an elected mayor can do for an area. In keeping with our 
predecessors,264 we are persuaded that the London Assembly’s scrutiny of the Mayor is 
effective, but recommend that it is given the power to call-in mayoral decisions, veto the 
Police and Crime Plan and, if necessary, reject the Mayor’s appointment of a Deputy 
Mayor. We further recommend that, as London acquires more devolved powers, the 
arrangements are kept under review. 
102. Darren Johnson noted that the London Assembly was “comparatively well resourced, 
compared with the London boroughs”.265 Indeed, adequate resourcing is an issue which 
was cited as a potential problem for overview and scrutiny committees in combined 
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authorities. The GLA Conservatives believed there were other problems with the scrutiny 
arrangements set out in the Devolution Bill. They said that the proposed model in the 
Devolution Bill had nothing like the London Assembly’s level of scrutiny or expertise and 
that:
The assembly or city-council model is much better at scrutinising at a city-wide 
level than a single scrutiny committee drawn from the respective component 
parts.
The London Assembly, amongst other things, produces between 30-40 policy 
reports every year; hosts 11 Plenary Meetings each year to hold senior public 
servants to account; and scrutinises the Mayor of London at 11 Mayor’s 
Question Time events that are televised and open to the public (often more 
than 100 are in attendance). A single scrutiny committee could not possible 
have this level of influence or power.266
We believe that the overview and scrutiny committees in the Devolution Bill should be a 
framework for more robust arrangements developed by local areas as a result of active 
discussions at local level. In developing their own scrutiny arrangements, local areas 
might wish to adapt or adopt some of the methods used by the London Assembly, such 
as broadcasting question times and public meetings, to hold the Mayor of London and 
Greater London Authority to account.  
266 GLA Conservatives (DEV 005) 
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8 Looking ahead
103. Devolution attracts cross-party support, particularly from our Committee. We 
welcome the fact that, at start of this new Parliament, the policy occupies such a prominent 
position on the Government’s agenda and acknowledge the Secretary of State’s significant 
role in this. We expect to see a continued commitment by the Government to devolution 
throughout this Parliament, including moves towards fiscal devolution.
104. At this stage, all conclusions on this topic are necessarily provisional; we anticipate 
returning to it throughout the Parliament as devolution deals continue to be agreed and 
their practical implications begin to develop. We have identified many aspects that will 
need review and further consideration over the next two or three years and set out how we 
will contribute to this below. However, there are various issues which should be addressed 
now: 
• Increasing public engagement and consultation throughout the deal-making process;
• Making that process more open and transparent;
• The need for a system for the monitoring and review of deals once in place; and 
• The need for clear objectives and measures for local areas to judge the impact of their 
deal. 
Our ambition is that, by the end of the Parliament, the Government and local authorities 
will have reached the position of devolution by right, with the Government having 
announced the powers that will be on offer to local government. This would be a starting 
point for even more ambitious and wide-ranging deals in the future.
105. As an immediate first step to inject more openness, transparency and public 
engagement into the deal-making process and assist local areas embarking on deals and 
preparing proposals, all information pertaining to devolution—agreed and updated 
deals, comparisons between deals, announcements relating to devolution, the criteria 
by which proposals are judged, objectives and measures, suggested timeframes, best 
practice in public engagement and scrutiny, the annual reports on devolution and, in 
time, the results from the monitoring of deals—should be published and collated on 
a Government website for all to access. The devolution resources hub267 created by the 
Local Government Association (LGA) performs a similar function and we suggest that, 
within the next two or three months, the Cities and Local Growth Unit works with the 
LGA to create and run its own devolution website. 
106. Before the end of this Parliament, once the majority of deals have bedded in and 
elected mayors have established their positions, we intend to undertake a review of the 
progress of devolution in England which will examine the issues that we have identified 
in this report. The review is likely to consider, but will not be limited to, the following:
267 Local Government Association, ‘DevoNext resources hub’, accessed 4 January 2015
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Success and scope:
• The success of devolution deals, measured by, for example, improvements to local 
economies and health economies, and whether we have reached the stage where 
powers can automatically be devolved to local areas as of right, and whether it is 
time for negotiation of further, more ambitious deals and/or a more comprehensive 
package of devolved measures between Government and local areas as a whole.
• What further powers areas have accumulated over time, including fiscal powers, 
and whether there are any powers not currently being devolved to local areas which 
should be.
• The impact on areas which do not have a devolution deal.
• Whether the Government is capturing data at the right level—for example, city 
region and combined authority level—to assess the effectiveness of deals.
• Local authorities’ views on the Government’s commitment to devolution, working 
with different Departments and the process of negotiation and consultation.
Progress:
• Progress with the development of further devolution to London, outside of the 
framework of the Bill.
• The rate at which the Government negotiated and agreed the 38 devolution bids 
submitted by local areas for the deadline of 4 September 2015 and whether any new 
deals are being agreed.
• The number of deals proposed since 4 September 2015 with new areas and the number 
of existing deals which have been extended.
Geography:
• The geographic spread of deals and the extent of devolution to non-metropolitan 
areas.
• Whether areas without deals which adjoin or are nearby those with deals are at an 
advantage or disadvantage and, if the latter, how this could be addressed.
Governance and accountability:
• With particular regards to health devolution, how accountability is working in 
practice.
• The impact elected mayors are having on local areas.
• How scrutiny is working in practice and whether local areas are building on the 
scrutiny requirements set out in the Devolution Bill.
• The extent to which local areas are engaging and consulting the public and whether 
local democracy has benefitted from devolution.
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Wider issues:
• Whether there are any signs that devolution is encouraging the restructuring of local 
government—for example, towards local authorities in two-tier areas becoming 
unitaries or a single, large authority across a combined authority area.
• How access to new sources of local finance—for example, 100 per cent retention of 
business rate growth—have impacted on local areas.
• How devolution deals relate to the debate on the UK constitution and whether the 
deals, once embedded in local areas, are a balance to devolution to Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland.
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Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. For most of the Orders brought forward under the Bill, parliamentary scrutiny is 
likely to be limited. We therefore recommend regular select committee scrutiny 
of statutory instruments implementing devolution and the Government’s annual 
report on devolution, which is required by the Devolution Bill; for example, the 
Transport Committee might wish to examine proposals for devolution of transport 
powers. (Paragraph 13)
Devolution: objectives and approach
2. We believe that the Government should set out the aims of its devolution policy 
more clearly, preferably in a way that would, over time, allow success to be measured. 
The Government needs a clear hierarchy for the many things it is trying to achieve 
through devolution—promoting local growth at minimum cost, achieving a better 
balanced economy, improving integration of public services, enhancing local 
freedom to experiment, bringing decision-making closer to local communities 
and enhancing the democratic process. It also needs to be clear how the forms of 
devolution it favours are intended to achieve them, while recognising that there may 
be a different balance and mix of objectives in different areas. (Paragraph 18)
3. Our witnesses gave us many important and ambitious reasons for pursuing 
devolution, particularly so for health devolution. However, with the exception of 
increasing economic growth, we are not certain whether these are intended to be 
the measurable objectives of devolution and are not convinced that the Government 
itself is any clearer. We are also not satisfied that the Government has considered and 
identified how to measure the success of a devolution deal once in place. (Paragraph 
21)
4. We recommend that the Government publishes, in order of priority, its long-term 
objectives for devolution, the mechanisms needed to achieve these and the means by 
which it will measure success. Following discussions with the local areas involved, 
relevant objectives can be incorporated in each devolution deal. This would enable 
areas to assess whether they are doing better with a deal than without. Linked to this, 
the Government should set up a mechanism for monitoring deals and reviewing 
and consulting the public on their impact. This would also make it easier to gather 
and disseminate best practice and lessons learnt. Local areas must have the powers 
needed to achieve the objectives of devolution, for example to integrate and deliver 
public services aligned to local needs. In the annual report (described in more detail 
at paragraph 45), they should state whether they have been given sufficient powers, 
levers and resources by each of the Government Departments involved to achieve 
the objectives of a deal and what more is needed. (Paragraph 22)
5. We believe that deal-making, which seeks to find a balance between a ‘bottom-up’ or 
‘top-down’ approach, is a pragmatic way to approach devolution, and we particularly 
agree with Lord Kerslake’s comments that a framework approach to devolution at 
this early stage in the process can lead to the lowest common denominator. The 
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natural consequence of deal-making is bespoke but asymmetric devolution as 
places ready to take on more powers put forward proposals and agree deals ahead 
of others.  (Paragraph 26)
6. In acknowledgement of this asymmetry, it should be made explicit in each devolution 
deal that areas may acquire further devolved powers over time. Where an area has 
asked for particular devolved powers but was refused them, if still desired, such 
powers should be available to that area if they have been given to other similar areas 
at a later date. By the end of the Parliament, we should have reached the position 
of devolution by right to local areas, with the Government having announced the 
powers that will be on offer to local government. This would then provide a basis for 
the negotiation of further, more ambitious deals covering new policy areas and/or 
a more comprehensive package of devolved measures agreed between Government 
and local government as a whole. (Paragraph 27)
Agreed deals
7. The Greater Manchester deal provides a prime example of the type of governance 
arrangements expected by the Government and the powers that might be devolved. 
As it is a product of the particular circumstances of that city which are unlikely to 
be reproduced in other areas in all their aspects, this deal should not be assumed 
to be a model for other areas pursuing devolution, even cities. However, other areas 
pursuing deals may wish to reflect upon and cultivate Manchester’s characteristics: 
a history of joint working between authorities, trust between leaders, acceptance 
that devolution will take place gradually and proactively presenting Government 
with ideas and solutions for their city. (Paragraph 34)
8. Due to the city’s unique circumstances, and also the fact that the population, 
their health challenges and the health economy are different from other places, 
health devolution in Greater Manchester is not a model for other areas. What is 
happening in Greater Manchester is, however, something for other areas to learn 
from. (Paragraph 36)
9. We appreciate that there will be areas of commonality between deals as certain 
powers, for example transport and business support, are natural candidates for 
devolution to local areas because of their role in driving economic growth. However, 
we have heard that areas are making imaginative and ambitious requests for specific 
powers only to have them turned down, which leads us to question the commitment 
across Government Departments to truly bespoke devolution (we consider this 
issue further in paragraphs 41-45). In each deal, we would expect to see more than 
“a few items” that are not common to other deals being devolved and are devised by 
an area as a unique response to its geography, economy or social needs. In addition, 
we would expect to see that commonly devolved powers reflect and respond to 
the geography, economy and social needs of the local area to which they pertain. 
(Paragraph 40)
10. There is an obvious difference between joint working and devolution, namely that 
devolution involves a transfer of responsibilities from, in this case, the DWP to a 
combined or local authority. With ‘joint working’, there is a risk that Departments 
will carry on without changing their practices. Devolution, on the other hand, leaves 
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decision-making in the hands of local politicians, with accountability to local voters. 
We recommend that, where the terms ‘joint working’, ‘joint commissioning’ and ‘co-
commissioning’ appear in a deal, they are challenged and defined in practical terms. 
In such cases, we would expect to see local areas actively involved in designing the 
project, performance management and its integration with existing local services. 
Joint working on or co-commissioning of services should be considered as a first 
step towards eventual fuller devolution. (Paragraph 42)
11. The Devolution Bill is just one part of enabling devolution. There also needs to 
be an enthusiasm for it across all Government Departments and a commitment 
to it as the ‘default position’, resulting in the devolution of substantial powers. 
Devolution should be as of right, not subject to the fluctuating enthusiasm of central 
government. The Devolution Bill should be seen as a first step towards a more 
comprehensive devolution framework for the whole of local government, covering 
significant spending and tax raising powers. Without this, economic growth, real 
public service reform, service integration, or any of the other objectives cited for 
devolution, will not be realised. (Paragraph 44)
12. We would like to see a culture of devolution embedded in all Government 
Departments. The annual report on devolution, which is required under the 
Devolution Bill, should be prepared with input from a wide range of Departments, 
such as the DWP, the Department of Health, the Department for Education and 
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. A section of this report, left 
unedited by Government, should comprise local authorities’ reports back on the 
Government’s commitment to devolution and rating their experience of different 
Departments, in terms of what the Department was like to work with and whether 
it fulfilled its part of the deal. The Committee will use the report as a means of 
scrutinising the Government, and it may also be of use to other stakeholders in 
holding the Government to account. (Paragraph 45)
13. All contact and communications about a deal with a local area should be made 
through the Cities and Local Growth Unit, regardless of which Department leads a 
deal. This would ensure consistency of approach across Government Departments 
and have the practical advantage of being a single channel of communication for 
local authorities. (Paragraph 47)
14. We are not at all convinced that the Government will have the capacity to work 
through all the bids that have been submitted and also to return to agreed deals to 
negotiate additional powers and then go on to deal with a ‘second wave’ of devolution 
proposals at a later date. Extra capacity will also be required to consider the wider, 
long-term implications of devolution for the Government and how it will change its 
modus operandi to deal with these. While it appears that the work is currently being 
adequately resourced, the Government should make an explicit commitment to 
provide the necessary additional resources as the number of deals under negotiation 
increases and, as discussed at paragraph 27, work on more extensive devolution 
develops. A programme of secondments of staff from the Cities and Local Growth 
Unit to local authorities, and vice versa, would aid sharing of knowledge, best 
practice and understanding of the different environments. (Paragraph 49)
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Bids, negotiation and agreement of deals: key themes
15. For devolution to take root and fulfil its aims, it needs to involve and engage the 
people it is designed to benefit. There has been a consistent very significant lack 
of public consultation, engagement and communication at all stages of the deal-
making process. This is due to areas having limited time in the run up to the 4 
September deadline. The Government drove the first wave of devolution deals 
through at a rapid pace (considered in more detail in the next section) which 
meant there was no opportunity for engagement with residents, or for residents 
to have their say on the principle of devolution or the framework of the specific 
deal proposed in their area. Despite this, we believe that local leaders could have 
communicated more effectively and extensively with their residents about the deal 
process, the contents of the deal and how it would affect them. It should, for example, 
have been clear to any citizen what their elected leaders were seeking to secure for 
the area in negotiating a devolution deal with the government. In addition, deals 
involving complex negotiations between national and local politicians do not lend 
themselves to public engagement However, from now on, efforts should be made to 
engage, consult and communicate with the public at all stages of the process—in the 
preparation of proposals, their negotiation and following agreement. Strategies to 
involve the public may include citizens’ juries, public meetings and, within the NHS 
and local government, staff engagement sessions. Once a deal is entrenched and its 
reforms have had the chance to take effect, the public should be consulted on their 
experience of its practical effects. (Paragraph 53)
16. We think it is too late to engage the public only once a deal has been agreed. While 
it is reasonable that the actual negotiations are not open to the public, steps should 
be taken to inject more openness into the process by publishing on the relevant 
authorities’ websites:
• Devolution proposals and the Government’s counter-offers, within a reasonable 
time of them being made; 
• An outline of what is being negotiated; and
• Drafts of the deal, and the text of the final deal. 
The Government should also publish the criteria it uses to assess and agree proposals 
so local areas can refer to these when drawing up their devolution bid. A similar level 
of transparency should continue to be maintained once the deal has been agreed. 
(Paragraph 56)
17. The Government is moving devolution forward at a rapid pace, which is welcome. 
However, some areas, particularly non-metropolitan areas, found it very challenging 
to meet the 4 September deadline. There is a risk that they may be rushing into 
bids which have not been properly planned and are based on relationships with 
neighbouring areas which have not had sufficient time to bed down. The Government 
also appears to be setting deadlines in accordance with events in the parliamentary 
and political calendar. We welcome the Secretary of State’s acknowledgement 
that some areas may take longer than others to submit bids and recommend that 
any deadlines imposed should take this into account. Then, once a bid has been 
submitted and negotiation on the content of the deal begins, the parties should 
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decide on an agreed and prompt timeframe, with fixed deadlines, not influenced by 
political criteria, for negotiation and agreement of the deal. It is essential that this 
takes into account the time needed to undertake consultation and engagement with 
the public. (Paragraph 60)
18. In addition, in accordance with the evidence given by the Minister, we suggest that 
the Government makes a clear statement that devolution will take place at different 
speeds in different places, and that taking time to craft a proposal to take account 
of local specificities will not adversely affect the Government’s response to it. This 
would encourage areas to spend longer building relationships, preparing proposals 
and consulting residents, and would be particularly beneficial for non-metropolitan 
areas. (Paragraph 61)
19. The recommendations we made above—encouraging devolution at different speeds 
and setting out a timeframe—would provide a clear process for parties to follow 
and would help to counter the perception that the Government is exerting too much 
influence over the deal-making process. (Paragraph 62)
20. It is often argued that urban areas are increasingly the source of the highest levels of 
economic innovation and growth and that, if the objective is economic rebalancing, 
this requires greater devolution to city regions. We understand and sympathise 
with this approach. Nevertheless, the agreement of a devolution deal with a non-
metropolitan two-tier area would help to address any sense that the Government 
is biased towards devolution to city regions. The next non-metropolitan deal will 
therefore be particularly significant and we look forward to one being agreed in the 
next six months. (Paragraph 63)
21. Nevertheless, we are concerned that this will not be the case for small towns and 
county areas outside the South East which risk being left out and left behind. The 
Government should consider this a major issue and monitor the impact of devolution 
deals on adjoining or nearby areas to assess whether such areas are benefitting or 
being left behind. (Paragraph 64)
Governance and Accountability
22. International comparisons aside, we heard evidence that there are benefits to be 
gained from having an elected mayor; for example leadership, strong accountability 
and a ‘go to’ voice for business However, we believe elected mayors are likely to be 
better suited to urban areas. The scale, geography and economic diversity of non-
metropolitan areas mean elected mayors are unlikely to be an easy fit. Local areas 
should be allowed to decide whether or not they wish to have an elected mayor. 
Those which do not want an elected mayor, but nonetheless want substantial 
devolved powers, should be allowed to propose an equally strong alternative model 
of governance. (Paragraph 70)
23. In fact, where a combined authority has been created, the mayor could be seen as 
a fifth tier of local government. Aside from the potential for confusion, which we 
discuss below, we think that the public will probably be left feeling that there is too 
much bureaucracy and too many politicians. There is a risk that this could lead to 
low turnouts at mayoral elections, which would have implications for the democratic 
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legitimacy of elected mayors. This is a consequence that needs to be addressed in the 
long-term, possibly by a move to having more unitary authorities (Paragraph 71)
24. As the DCLG says, the overview and scrutiny requirements in the Bill are an initial 
framework to be used as a basis for more robust provisions, which we believe have 
a role in fostering public confidence in the new arrangements, as well as balancing 
vested interests. These should be developed to suit the characteristics of the local 
areas as a result of deliberate efforts to hold active discussions at local level, with 
residents involved in designing new and more open methods of scrutiny. Local 
areas need to give active consideration to how the mayor will work with the council 
leaders and how s/he will be held to account. Although the elected mayor is intended 
to be a ‘first among equals’, s/he may soon establish, or already have, a profile and 
position which makes this balance difficult to achieve. (Paragraph 77)
25. There will be a complex division of responsibility between local authorities, the 
combined authority and the elected mayor which will not necessarily be apparent to 
the public. However, as the figurehead, people are going to hold the elected mayor 
accountable, regardless of whether or not s/he has responsibility As a result, careful 
thought needs to be given to determining the division of responsibility in a way that 
provides a coherent set of powers and makes sense to the public; this should be an 
integral part of the deal-making process with the division of responsibilities written 
into the deal. (Paragraph 79)
Health devolution
26. Health devolution has great potential. In the context of some areas, such as Greater 
Manchester, it is a necessary step to design health and care to suit the circumstances 
of a particular place, to speed up and enhance existing work on integration and 
help address the cultural challenges posed by joint working for the NHS and local 
government. In other areas, however, health devolution may not be needed in the 
short term to advance and improve health and social care. But, to achieve a great 
deal more in the longer term, real devolution and a transfer of more power to local 
government is needed. (Paragraph 85)
27. However, health devolution has arrived at a particularly difficult time for the health 
and social care system and its staff: there has been significant structural change 
in recent years and there is now an unprecedented level of financial challenge. 
With such uncertainty, we are concerned about the long-term consequences and 
recommend that, over an appropriate timescale, the Government gathers evidence 
on the impact of these reforms. It is important that areas should not pursue formal 
health devolution at the expense of health and social care initiatives with similar 
aims that are proving fruitful. Areas that do wish to pursue health devolution must 
have clearly defined objectives for what they expect it to deliver.  (Paragraph 86)
28. We reiterate, however, that, from now on, the public must be engaged, consulted and 
communicated with throughout the devolution process and once a deal has been 
agreed. Public engagement is particularly important in the case of health devolution 
where the complexity of the systems in place make understanding the consequences 
of change more difficult in an area where the public’s response is likely to be more 
emotional. (Paragraph 87)
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29. Accountability in health and social care is already extremely complex and further 
changes, such as the creation of an elected mayor, are likely to leave patients feeling 
confused about who they should approach for information or to pursue complaints. 
Any health devolution agreement should be accompanied by plans for how the 
changes taking place will be communicated to residents. Residents should be 
informed about the new structures and responsibilities and be told where to go for 
information and advice and to make complaints. (Paragraph 88)
30. We found this explanation [of accountability for services] confusing. It is unclear to 
us how accountability will work in practice. (Paragraph 89)
31. It would appear that their powers do not extend to regulating a local authority’s 
financial contribution to a pooled budget and it was not clear which body was in 
fact responsible for checking their financial position. There is also a lack of clarity 
about the audit and regulation of pooled budgets and, in particular, oversight of the 
sustainability of local authorities’ contributions. Again, we were left feeling that the 
arrangements the Minister described were more aspirational than a thought-through 
and watertight system of financial regulation. There is a need for a clear articulation 
of how health devolution will work and for clear governance arrangements set out in 
a way that residents, patients and staff can understand. This will ensure there is no 
adverse impact on the quality of local services and that services are accountable. We 
are not satisfied that there has been sufficient consideration as to how pooled budgets 
will be regulated and audited and how they will be handled in practice. Unless this 
is carefully considered, we risk both not having the flexibility to use budgets to 
reflect local priorities and facilitate joint working and replicating locally the silos 
that exist at national level. This applies to services devolved from all Government 
Departments, not just health We would like the Government to revisit this issue 
on an ongoing basis as health devolution is rolled out and embedded in local areas. 
(Paragraph 90)
32. The Government should set out the steps it will take to ensure the relevant 
Departments share data, for example relating to Attendance Allowance, with the 
NHS and local authorities. (Paragraph 91)
33. While we were satisfied with the plans [for the treatment of specialised services] 
we received, we highlight this as an issue which needs to be carefully monitored in 
emerging health devolution agreements. (Paragraph 92)
London
34. Devolution to London was successful because it enabled the city to meet the key 
challenges it faced in 2000. Sixteen years on, London faces a series of additional 
challenges including housing and skills, which are not addressed by the existing 
devolution framework. London is therefore not only ready for further devolution, 
but urgently needs it. In keeping with the recommendations of our predecessors, 
we believe fiscal devolution is essential to London’s continuing success. The scale 
of growth of service demand alone in London requires significant investment in 
infrastructure for which fiscal devolution is required. (Paragraph 96)
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35. We agree that, depending on what makes most sense, certain types of reform and 
devolution in London will and should happen at regional or subregional level and 
that arrangements will be more complicated than in other areas. However, there is 
a real risk of confusion for the public, and indeed for officers, in having three levels 
of governance and particular efforts should be given to avoiding such confusion. 
(Paragraph 97)
36. Both the current Mayor of London and his predecessor have been judged to be 
successful in their role. It remains to be seen whether elected mayors for combined 
authorities are similarly successful. Not having the same profile, they are unlikely 
to enjoy the same level of influence and leverage as the Mayor of London. However, 
the office does demonstrate what an elected mayor can do for an area. In keeping 
with our predecessors, we are persuaded that the London Assembly’s scrutiny of 
the Mayor is effective, but recommend that it is given the power to call-in mayoral 
decisions, veto the Police and Crime Plan and, if necessary, reject the Mayor’s 
appointment of a Deputy Mayor. We further recommend that, as London acquires 
more devolved powers, the arrangements are kept under review. (Paragraph 101)
37. We believe that the overview and scrutiny committees in the Devolution Bill should 
be a framework for more robust arrangements developed by local areas as a result 
of active discussions at local level. In developing their own scrutiny arrangements, 
local areas might wish to adapt or adopt some of the methods used by the London 
Assembly, such as broadcasting question times and public meetings, to hold the 
Mayor of London and Greater London Authority to account. (Paragraph 102)
Looking ahead
38. We expect to see a continued commitment by the Government to devolution 
throughout this Parliament, including moves towards fiscal devolution. (Paragraph 
103)
39. As an immediate first step to inject more openness, transparency and public 
engagement into the deal-making process and assist local areas embarking on deals 
and preparing proposals, all information pertaining to devolution—agreed and 
updated deals, comparisons between deals, announcements relating to devolution, 
the criteria by which proposals are judged, objectives and measures, suggested 
timeframes, best practice in public engagement and scrutiny, the annual reports 
on devolution and, in time, the results from the monitoring of deals—should be 
published and collated on a Government website for all to access. The devolution 
resources hub created by the Local Government Association (LGA) performs a 
similar function and we suggest that, within the next two or three months, the Cities 
and Local Growth Unit works with the LGA to create and run its own devolution 
website. (Paragraph 105)
40. Before the end of this Parliament, once the majority of deals have bedded in and 
elected mayors have established their positions, we intend to undertake a review of 
the progress of devolution in England which will examine the issues that we have 
identified in this report. The review is likely to consider, but will not be limited to, 
the following:
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Success and scope:
• The success of devolution deals, measured by, for example, improvements to 
local economies and health economies, and whether we have reached the stage 
where powers can automatically be devolved to local areas as of right, and 
whether it is time for negotiation of further, more ambitious deals and/or a more 
comprehensive package of devolved measures between Government and local 
areas as a whole.
• What further powers areas have accumulated over time, including fiscal powers, 
and whether there are any powers not currently being devolved to local areas 
which should be.
• The impact on areas which do not have a devolution deal.
• Whether the Government is capturing data at the right level—for example, city 
region and combined authority level—to assess the effectiveness of deals.
• Local authorities’ views on the Government’s commitment to devolution, working 
with different Departments and the process of negotiation and consultation.
Progress:
• Progress with the development of further devolution to London, outside of the 
framework of the Bill.
• The rate at which the Government negotiated and agreed the 38 devolution bids 
submitted by local areas for the deadline of 4 September 2015 and whether any 
new deals are being agreed.
• The number of deals proposed since 4 September 2015 with new areas and the 
number of existing deals which have been extended.
Geography:
• The geographic spread of deals and the extent of devolution to non-metropolitan 
areas.
• Whether areas without deals which adjoin or are nearby those with deals are 
at an advantage or disadvantage and, if the latter, how this could be addressed. 
Governance and accountability:
• With particular regards to health devolution, how accountability is working in 
practice.
• The impact elected mayors are having on local areas.
• How scrutiny is working in practice and whether local areas are building on the 
scrutiny requirements set out in the Devolution Bill.
• The extent to which local areas are engaging and consulting the public and 
whether local democracy has benefitted from devolution.
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Wider issues:
• Whether there are any signs that devolution is encouraging the restructuring 
of local government—for example, towards local authorities in two-tier areas 
becoming unitaries or a single, large authority across a combined authority area. 
• How access to new sources of local finance—for example, 100 per cent retention 
of business rate growth—have impacted on local areas. 
• How devolution deals relate to the debate on the UK constitution and whether 
the deals, once embedded in local areas, are a balance to devolution to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. (Paragraph 106)
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Alison Thewliss
Draft Report (Devolution: the next five years and beyond) proposed by the Chair, brought 
up and read.
Ordered, That the Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 106 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
 [Adjourned until Monday 1 February at 3.15 p.m. 
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry page of 
the Committee’s website.
Monday 12 October 2015 Question number
Professor Colin Copus, De Montfort University, Professor Andy Pike, 
Newcastle University, and Alexandra Jones, Chief Executive, Centre for 
Cities Q1–52
Monday 26 October 2015
Tony Lloyd, Interim Mayor, Greater Manchester Combined Authority, Sue 
Derbyshire, Vice-Chair, Greater Manchester Combined Authority, and 
Leader, Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council, and Kieran Quinn, 
Leader, Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council Q53–70
Professor Karel Williams, University of Manchester, and David Fernandez-
Arias, Greater Manchester Referendum Campaign for Democratic 
Devolution Q71–78
Joe Anderson, Mayor of Liverpool, Joanne Roney, Chief Executive, 
Wakefield Council, West Yorkshire Combined Authority, and Chris Murray, 
Director, Core Cities Q79–98
Tuesday 10 November 2015
Ian Williamson, Chief Officer, Greater Manchester Health and Social 
Care Devolution, Rob Webster, Chief Executive, NHS Confederation, 
and Councillor Linda Thomas, Vice Chair, Local Government Association 
Wellbeing Portfolio Q99–129
Councillor Paul Carter, Chair, County Councils Network, Councillor John 
Pollard, Leader, Cornwall Council, and Councillor Alan Rhodes, Leader, 
Nottinghamshire County Council Q130–157
Monday 23 November 2015
Lord Kerslake, Chair, Centre for Public Scrutiny, Ed Cox, Director, Institute 
for Public Policy Research (North), and Councillor Sue Jeffrey, Chair, 
Shadow Tees Valley Combined Authority and Leader, Redcar and Cleveland 
Borough Council Q158–190
Sir Edward Lister, Deputy Mayor of London, Darren Johnson, Chair, London 
Assembly, and John O’Brien, Chief Executive, London Councils Q191–212
Monday 30 November 2015
Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP, Minister of State for Community and Social Care, 
Department of Health, and Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, Minister of State for 
Employment, Department for Work and Pensions Q213–259
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Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, Secretary of State, Department for Communities 
and Local Government, and James Wharton MP, Minister for Local Growth 
and the Northern Powerhouse, Department for Communities and Local 
Government Q260–306
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Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry page of the 
Committee’s website. DEV numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and 
so may not be complete.
1 Association of Colleges (DEV0024)
2 Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (DEV0043)
3 British Medical Association (DEV0003)
4 British Property Federation (DEV0028)
5 Carillion (DEV0044)
6 CEDOS and ADEPT (DEV0013)
7 Centre for Cities (DEV0031)
8 Centre for Public Scrutiny (DEV0041)
9 Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies, Newcastle University (DEV0023)
10 Citizens Advice (DEV0049)
11 Committee on Standards in Public Life (DEV0045)
12 Core Cities (DEV0014)
13 County Councils Network (DEV0052)
14 Department for Communities and Local Government (DEV0027)
15 Dr Richard Carr (DEV0058)
16 EEF – The Manufacturers’ Organisation (DEV0051)
17 Electoral Reform Society (DEV0032)
18 England’s Economic Heartland (DEV0037)
19 Essex County Council (DEV0035)
20 Futures Network West Midlands (DEV0007)
21 GLA Conservatives (DEV0005)
22 Greater Manchester Combined Authority (DEV0009)
23 Greater Manchester Health & Social Care Devolution (DEV0056)
24 Historic England (DEV0034)
25 Industrial Communities Alliance (DEV0047)
26 Institute of Economic Development (DEV0018)
27 IPPR North (DEV0029)
28 Local Government Association (DEV0021)
29 London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DEV0015)
30 London Councils (DEV0033)
31 London Forum of Amenity and Civic Societies (DEV0050)
32 Mayor of London’s Office (DEV0042)
33 Merseyside Police & Crime Commissioner (DEV0054)
34 Ms Susan Hedley (DEV0016)
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35 News Media Association (DEV0002)
36 NHS Confederation (DEV0046)
37 NHS Confederation (DEV0057)
38 NHS Providers (DEV0030)
39 NLGN (DEV0053)
40 Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for North Yorkshire (DEV0022)
41 Office of the South Yorkshire PCC (DEV0004)
42 Office of the Sussex Police & Crime Commissioner (DEV0011)
43 Optical Confederation and Local Optical Committee Support Unit (DEV0048)
44 Police and Crime Commissioners of the Yorkshire and Humberside Region (DEV0012)
45 Professor Colin Copus (DEV0019)
46 Professor Francesca Gains and Professor Vivien Lowndes (DEV0020)
47 Revolving Doors Agency (DEV0039)
48 Royal Institute of British Architects (DEV0025)
49 Royal Town Planning Institute (DEV0017)
50 Sarah Ayres (DEV0006)
51 Shelter (DEV0038)
52 Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and Senior Managers (DEV0036)
53 South East England Councils (DEV0026)
54 University of Sheffield (DEV0055)
55 Wakefield Council (DEV0010)
56 West Midlands Police & Crime Commissioner David Jamieson (DEV0040)
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List of Reports from the Committee 
during the current Parliament
All publications from the Committee are available on the Committee’s website at 
www.parliament.uk/clg.
Session 2015-16
First Special  
Report
Child sexual exploitation in Rotherham: Ofsted and 
further government issues: Ofsted Response to the 
Committee’s Ninth Report of Session 2014-15
HC 435 
Second Special 
Report
Private rented sector: the evidence from banning 
letting agents’ fees in Scotland: Government 
Response to the Committee’s Eighth Report of 
Session 2014-15
HC 434
